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Articles
Negotiating at the Interface of Power and
Law: The Crime of Aggression
BETH VAN SCHAACK*

Delegates recently convened in Kampala, Uganda to
lay the groundwork for the International Criminal
Court's eventual prosecution of the crime of aggres-

sion. This achievement caps decades of negotiations
that began in the post-World War Iperiod. From virtually the beginning of the negotiations, it was argued
that an aggressionprosecution should not go forward
absent some definitive showing that a state had committed a predicate act of aggression. Delegations diverged on which body-the Security Council or the
court itself-should be empowered to determine
whether a predicate act of aggression had occurred
and whether it was necessaryfor the putative aggressor state(s), the victim state(s), or both, to have consented to the court's jurisdiction before a prosecution
could proceed. The end product was an unimpeacha* B.A., Stanford University; J.D., Yale Law School. I served on the U.S. delegation
to the International Criminal Court Review Conference in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda as the
Academic Advisor. Needless to say, the views expressed herein (and any errors) are entirely
my own and do not reflect the position of the government of the United States. All material
contained in this Article is available in the public record or is derived from my notes of the
Review Conference. I am indebted to Todd Buchwald, John Daley, David Koplow, William
K. Lietzau, Teresa McHenry, Jonathan Morganthau, Diane Orentlicher, Michael Surgalla,
Ron Slye and Allen Weiner for their assistance with this article. Diane Amann, Stefan
Barriga, Catherine Br6lmann, Meg DeGuzman, Saira Mohamed and David Sloss gave
valuable comments on the draft. Special thanks go to Harold Hongju Koh and Stephen Rapp
for inviting me to join the U.S. delegation in Kampala. Thanks also go to Martin Guerbadot,
Nicola Gladitz and Mary Sexton for their excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to

the Columbia Journal of TransnationalLaw for their excellent work on this piece. Some of

this research is also featured in the series on the crime of aggression on IntLawGrrls,
http:/intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/1abel/Crime%/"20ofo20aggression%/"2Oseries.
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ble regime of state consent that completely insulates
the nationals of Non-Party States from prosecution
and allows States Parties to opt out of the crime entirely. The results achieved in Kampala have subtly
eroded the primacy of the Security Council, as states
revealed a preference for a consent-based regime and
a willingness to extend internationalcriminaljurisdiction to their own nationals and over their own foreign
policies. Indeed, the aggression amendments may
have actually diminished the efficacy of the Council's
pre-existing referral power and created the potential
for greaterconflict between the Council and the court.
The outcome in Kampala thus presents a microcosm
of the continual thinning of state sovereignty and the
indelible shift in the balance between power and law
in internationalrelations. This Article examines the
aggression amendments and the process by which they
were adopted, concluding with a discussion of the way
in which the negotiations and the final amendments
invoked and rebalanced the central themes of power
politics, state consent and judicial independence within public internationallaw.
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INTRODUCTION

State representatives recently completed marathon negotiations, resulting in the insertion of amendments1 into the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC or the court) and laying the
groundwork for the eventual prosecution of the crime of aggression.
In so doing, negotiators achieved a goal that the original drafters of
the treaty had been unable to accomplish initially and completed a
task the international community has been struggling with for decades. Throughout this process, state representatives hovered between
two competing and ultimately irreconcilable positions. At one pole
rests the contested dogma of Security Council (the Council) exclusivity in the face of breaches of the peace; at the other pole rests the
conviction that the ICC, as a judicial and penal body, should be empowered to act independently, beyond the control of any political
body and independent of the consent of states. Concessions and the
moderation of interests are always predictable in the context of multilateral negotiations, but in this case, the compromise between these
two positions resulted in an unprincipled and potentially unworkable

1. Res. RC/Res.6, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/icedocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter
Aggression
Resolution].
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system that betrays both imperatives. Instead of either empowering
the Council to control aggression prosecutions or granting the court
free reign to prosecute crimes of aggression, delegates adopted a regime of state consent-premised on an opt-out option and the complete exclusion of Non-Party States-to limit the court's reach. The
outcome was facilitated by confusion over which of several competing amendment procedures should govern the aggression amendments. This uncertainty created an opening for creative, if not frenzied, juggling of various potential solutions to the jurisdictional
impasse. Indeed, the entry into force provision became the lynchpin
of the entire package. In the end, delegates decided upon a delayed
and conditional operationalization of the crime of aggression, subject
to a further decision by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) by at
least 2017 to allow some combination of the three trigger mechanisms-the Security Council, state party referrals and the Prosecutor
actingproprio motu-to function.

In Parts I through III, this Article examines the process by
which the aggression amendments were adopted. Part I introduces
the central themes at issue, presents a short history of multilateral efforts to codify the crime and its jurisdictional regime and introduces
the negotiating dynamics. Because it remained unchanged from the
start of the recent Review Conference, the definition of aggression is
considered tangentially only insofar as it exerted an influence on the
jurisdictional regime under development. 2 Part II provides a thick
description of the arc of the most recent negotiations and recounts
states' recurring efforts to mix and match jurisdictional elements both
to reach a consensus outcome and to avoid either a contentious vote
or further deferral of the entire project. Part III discusses the validity
of the substantive arguments made by negotiating states and their
rhetorical impact and offers a critique of the negotiation process. The
Article closes with a discussion of how the negotiations and the final
amendments invoked and rebalanced central themes of public international law-power politics, state consent and judicial independence-particularly with regard to the role of the Security Council in
managing threats to and breaches of the peace. Notwithstanding a
suggestion in the original ICC Statute that there should be greater
harmonization between the ICC and the Security Council in the ag-

2. This Article focuses on the jurisdictional regime governing the crime of
aggression; a companion piece will focus on the definition of the crime. See Beth Van
Schaack, The Grass That Gets Trampled When ElephantsFight: Will the Codification of the
Crime ofAggression Protect Women?, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1676506.
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gression context, 3 the Security Council was not ultimately accorded
any additional powers vis-a-vis aggression prosecutions by states.
Indeed, the aggression amendments may have actually diminished
the efficacy of the Council's pre-existing referral power 4 and created
the potential for greater conflict between the Council and the court.
The results achieved in Kampala have thus subtly eroded the primacy
of the Security Council, as a vast majority of states revealed a preference for an unimpeachable consent-based regime and a willingness to
extend international criminal jurisdiction to their own nationals and
over their own foreign policies. The outcome in Kampala is thus a
microcosm of the continual thinning of state sovereignty and the indelible shift in the balance between power and law in contemporary
international relations.
I. NEGOTIATING A CRIME OF AGGRESSION

The idea of prosecuting those who launch unjust wars has
deep roots, 5 although it was not until the post-World War II era that
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(2), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998, corrected by procds-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998, July 12,
1999, Nov. 30, 1999, May 8, 2000, Jan. 17, 2001 and Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter ICC
Statute] ("The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision
is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime."),
available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome-statute%/ 28e%/"29.pdf.
4. See Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 331, 355 (2009) (describing international

criminal law as "a mechanism for achieving reform of the Security Council over the long
haul by gradually hiving off parts of its mandate and authority.").
5. Just war theory goes back centuries. See generally THE MORALITY OF WAR:
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS (Larry May et al. eds., 2006) (compiling excerpts

from just war theorists). In the face of atrocities committed during World War 1, the
victorious Allies and Associated Powers convened a Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties to inquire into culpable conduct of
particular individuals-"however highly placed"-accused of breaching international law.
Foreshadowing the notion of crimes against the peace later developed at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, the Commission considered "not strictly war crimes, but acts which provoked the
war or accompanied its inception," such as deliberate violations of the neutrality of Belgium
and Luxembourg. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (March
29, 1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95, 118 (1920). See generally Sheldon Gleuck,
The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396, 401-03 (1946).
Notwithstanding early support for prosecuting the Kaiser and others for initiating World War
I, the Commission adopted the U.S. position and concluded that acts of aggression should
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the international community identified the launching of an aggressive
war as a criminal act. In the lexicon of the era, this was deemed a
"crime against the peace." 6 Indeed, it was this crime-rather than
genocide-that became the centerpiece of the Nuremberg trial, which
was to be the "trial to end all wars."7 This pride of place reflected the
reasoning, set forth in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, that aggressive war was the proximate
cause of all of World War II's atrocities: "To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." 8
Defining and prosecuting aggressive war, although not uncontroversial,9 proved relatively easy following the complete defeat of
the states responsible for acts of aggression in World War 11.10 Hownot be the subject of prosecution in light of the lack of legal authority for such a charge and
the complexity of undertaking an investigation into the politically charged question of the
causes of the war, which it viewed as a question for historians and statesmen, rather than a
penal tribunal. Id. at 402 (noting that the Commission concluded that determining the
"authorship of the war would entail many handicaps of proof').
6. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Protocol, Aug. 8, 1945,
art. 6(a), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (defining crimes against the peace).
7.

David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 Soc. RES. 779, 781 (1987).

The

quote is a riff on President Woodrow Wilson's too optimistic prediction that World War I
would be the "war to end all wars." RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER 239-40 (2006).

Crimes against the peace took center stage in Tokyo too, overshadowing the many war
crimes and crimes against humanity that were committed in the Pacific theater. See 101-103
THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL 48,413-49,591 (R. John Pritchard, ed. 1998)
(discussing crimes against the peace) [hereinafter TOKYO JUDGMENT]; id. at 49,591-49,761

(recounting conventional war crimes and other atrocities).
8. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment (Oct. 1, 1946), reprintedin
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 186 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
9. The notion of crimes against the peace was the most controversial element of the
Charter at the time. See F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the InternationalLaw of/the

Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 783 (1947) ("Most controversial among the broad legal
aspect of the Nuremberg Trial is the basic concept that aggressive war is not only illegal in
international law but that those 'who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and
terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing."') (quoting the Nuremberg
Judgment); see also George Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and InternationalLaw, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 20, 25-37 (1947); Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L

L. 38,62-67(1947).
10. The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted twelve of nineteen defendants indicted for
crimes against the peace in Count 2. Although in Count 1 the Prosecution indicted all
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ever, when the international community turned its attention to building what would eventually be known as the International Criminal
Court, controversies emerged to stymie efforts to codify the crime for
more general application in the future.
A. Post-World War II Efforts to Codify the Crime ofAggression
The International Law Commission, the first body to undertake the effort, was unable to agree on a definition of the crime of
aggression; this indecision ultimately delayed progress on the ICC
project for years." Starting in 1967, the UN General Assembly
tasked several special committees to define aggression. 12 This effort
eventually led to a consensus definition in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) that was meant to guide the Security Council in implementing its peace and security mandate. 13 After a period of Cold
War quiescence, the ICC idea was revived and states again sought to
define the crime. 14 While influential, the definition of aggression in
Resolution 3314 did not easily lend itself to a penal context, so other
options were explored.'5 Delegates attending six sessions of Preparatwenty-four defendants for engaging in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes
against peace, the Tribunal only convicted eight defendants for this crime. Nuremberg
Judgment, supra note 8, at 333. The Tokyo Tribunal convicted twenty-six out of twentyeight defendants for waging aggressive war.

103 TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 7, at

49,773-49,858 (recounting verdicts).
11. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 897
(IX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/897(IX) (Dec. 4, 1954) (postponing work on the Draft Code in light
of the convening of a Special Committee of representatives from nineteen member states to
consider the crime of aggression).
12. See, e.g., Question of Defining Aggression, G.A. Res. 895 (IX), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/895(IX) (Dec. 4, 1954) (creating a Special Committee to prepare and submit a report
on the question of defining aggression).
13. Definition of Aggression, G.A.
A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).

Res. 3314

(XXIX), Annex,

U.N.

Doc.

14. See Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res.
33/97, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/97 (Dec. 16, 1978) (according priority to the Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in light of the completion of a
definition of aggression); Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, G.A. Res. 36/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/106 (Dec. 10, 1981) (inviting the ILC to
resume its work on the Draft Code).
15. See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Grp.
on the Crime of Aggression, 5th Sess., Nov. 23 Dec. 1, 2006, Infbrmal Inter-Sessional
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 11 7-13, U.N. Doc.
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-SWGCA-INFlEnglish.pdf
(discussing debates over

HeinOnline -- 49 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 511 2010-2011

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

512

[49:505

tory Committees in 1996-1998 and the 1998 Rome Conference,
where the ICC Statute was finally opened for signature, were again
unable to agree on the definition of aggression or on a jurisdictional
regime to govern the crime's prosecution. And so almost everyone
agreed to punt, listing the crime within the court's jurisdiction at the
last minute' 6 but delaying consideration of the remaining details to a
mandatory Review Conference to be convened in seven years.' 7 The
only guidance the negotiators in Rome offered their successors was
the cryptic declaration in Article 5(2) of the ICC Statute that any preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression should be "consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations." 18 A series of Preparatory Commissions
(1999-2002), Special Working Groups (2003-2009) and informal
gatherings held at Princeton University (2004-2007) then took up the
task in the period leading up to the planned 2010 Review Conference
in Kampala, Uganda.
B. The Kampala Review Conference
Despite years of multilateral negotiations pre- and post-Rome,
delegates arrived at the Review Conference with the most contentious issues still undecided, although the definition of the crime enjoyed a shaky consensus. 19 The perennial difficulty of reaching consensus on when and how to prosecute the crime of aggression
stemmed from the recognition that the crime by its nature involves
whether Resolution 3314 could provide a penal definition and suggesting alternatives,
including the World War II definition of crimes against the peace).
16.

Andreas Zimmennan, Article 5, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 97, 104-05

(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) (noting lack of consensus in Rome over the definition of the crime
of aggression).
17. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 123 (providing for a mandatory Review Conference
to consider amendments to the Statute, including the list of crimes contained in Article 5).
18. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 5(2). ("The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to the crime. Such provision shall be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.").
19.

Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group on

the Crime of Aggression, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION:
MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, 1,

3 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2009) (noting that the definitional issues "could be regarded as
contained, but not necessarily as resolved").

HeinOnline -- 49 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 512 2010-2011

THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

20111

513

both state action and individual conduct. From virtually the beginning of the negotiations, it was argued that an aggression prosecution
should not go forward absent some definitive showing that a state
had committed a predicate act of aggression. 20 Where delegations
diverged was in deciding which body should be empowered to determine this consensus: the oligarchic Security Council, in keeping
with its role under the UN Charter as the guarantor of peace and security, or a different body, including perhaps the court itself. Because state action was a central element of an aggression prosecution,
delegates also raised the question of whether it was necessary for
some state-the putative aggressor state(s), the victim state(s) or all
of the above states-to have consented to the court's jurisdiction before a prosecution could proceed. Although these two issues-the
role of the Security Council and state consent-were present in
Rome, they emerged in starker relief in Kampala.
C. The Negotiating Dynamics
Indeed, the negotiating dynamics in Kampala were considerably more complex than they had been in Rome. In Rome, the socalled "Like-Minded States," 21 overwhelmingly supported by the
non-governmental organization (NGO) community, were able to garner a large and disparate alliance in favor of a strong and largely independent Court. 22 In Kampala, by contrast, the negotiations over
20. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 4th
Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 3, 2005, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working

Group on the Crime of Aggression, June 13-15, 2005, 63, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/4/32,
Annex II.A (2005) [hereinafter June 2005 SWGCA Report], available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D224718C-39EF-477C-BO28-F434F4BF78AE/0/Annexes.pdf ("While
there was general agreement that any provisions on the crime of aggression would have to be
consistent with the Charter, there were considerable differences of opinion as to whether this
implied that there had to be a prior determination of the act of aggression and whether such
determination fell within the exclusive competence of the Security Council."); see also
Giorgio Gaja, The Long Journey Towards Repressing Aggression, in I THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 427, 433 (Antonio Cassese et al.

eds., 2002) (recounting pre-Rome efforts to establish a Security Council filter for the crime
of aggression).
21. The Like-Minded States comprised the Europeans-with the exception of the
United Kingdom and France who remained aligned with the other members of the Security
Council for the majority of the Rome Conference-and many developing nations. Philippe
Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conlerence, in 1 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 67,

70-71 (discussing negotiating dynamics in Rome).
22.

Id.
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the crime of aggression splintered along more diverse fault lines.
Prominent in one camp were China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States, the permanent five members of the
Security Council (known as the P-5), along with a few key allies,
who sought to place limits on the definition of aggression. In particular, this camp insisted that the UN Charter and policy considerations required that the Security Council have the exclusive power to
control prosecutions for the crime of aggression. 23 A second campfeaturing many members of the group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), the so-called "African Group" of States
Parties, a handful of European states and other smaller States Parties-defended the expansive definition of the crime. 24 They also
pushed for a jurisdictional regime that would apply without requiring
state consent and would be unfettered by the Security Council 25 (or at
least no more fettered than it was vis-A-vis the original core crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). 26 Although
members of this "coalition" made impassioned interventions, it was
never clear to what extent their united public stance belied a more
deep-seated ambivalence toward the crime. A third group of diverse
States Parties were wary of according the Security Council hegemony on the question of aggression but did not share the larger coalition's visions of an expansive aggression regime. They sought alternative ways to cabin the court's jurisdiction over the crime that
would not alienate the Council's permanent members. 27 NGOs were
also split. Some remained agnostic toward the crime on the ground

23. See infra text accompanying notes 204-210.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 110- 114.
26. The original Statute empowers the Security Council to defer a prosecution for a
renewable one-year period. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16 ("No investigation or
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by
the Council under the same conditions."). Earlier drafts of this provision had required
Security Council approval before a prosecution could go forward. See Mohamed El Zeidy,
The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC Statute: Security
Council Powter of Deferrals and Resolution 1422, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1503, 150910 (2002). The exercise of the veto would have blocked a prosecution. Id. In 1997,
Singapore proposed flipping the presumption to allow the Security Council to halt a
prosecution. Id. at 1510-11. Delegates ultimately adopted the so-called "Singapore
Compromise" in Rome. Id. at 1510 n.37. Under the current system, the exercise of the veto
allows a prosecution to go forward. Id. at 1511.
27. See infi-a text accompanying notes 153-160.
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that it ostensibly fell outside their mandate, 28 others opposed it out of
fear that it would distract the court from the atrocity crimes, 29 and
still others supported the crime as a way to prevent the commission
of other crimes within the court's jurisdiction and bring about a more
peaceful world. 30
In the end, the P-5's two sets of interlocutors found themselves drawn toward two irreconcilable positions. One positionidealistic, if not hopelessly naive-was premised on an independent
Court capable of exercising a universal form of jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. The other position-a more cautious one articulated most often by the Canadian delegation-insisted that jurisdiction be premised on some manifestation of state consent.3 1 These
groups ought to have been natural allies against the P-5's position
that the Council should control aggression prosecutions. However,
they struggled to overcome collective action problems and find
common ground on a jurisdictional package that did not involve the
Security Council, despite a host of creative solutions put forward in
Kampala. For their part, the P-5 also had difficulty asserting their
full influence. With China, Russia and the United States all serving
as observers during the negotiations, and the United States a late28. Amnesty International, for example, claimed neutrality, although it did take
positions on elements of the jurisdictional regime, insisting, for example, on no Security
Council control over the crime and no right of States Parties to opt out. Amnesty Int'l,
InternationalCriminal Court: Making the Right Choices at the Review Conference, at 1115, Al Index IOR 40/008/2010 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/IOR40/008/2010 /en/faad9888-c9fb-425a-98bc-fcceI d5e075f/ior4000820I Oen.
pdf; see also Coalition for the Int'l Crim. Ct., The Crime of Aggression,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression ("The CICC as a whole did not take a position
concerning the adoption of specific provisions on the crime of aggression at Kampala. This
was because CICC members developed varying positions concerning the complex
discussions on the crime.").
29. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, Making Kampala Count, I (May 10, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/10/making-kampala-count ("We fear that inclusion
of a definition and jurisdictional filter could diminish the court's role-and the perceptions
of that role-as an impartial judicial arbiter of international criminal law.").

30. See Jutta F. Bertram-Nothnagel, Director of Relations of Intergovernmental
Organizations, Union International des Avocats, Statement at the Review Conference of the
International Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda (June 4, 2010) (on file with author) (arguing
for the adoption of an effective amendment adding the crime of aggression); see also
F6d6ration Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, ICC Review Conference: Renewing
Commitment to Accountability, 24 (May 25, 2010), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
KampalaCPI543a-2.pdf (arguing for the independence of the ICC vis-A-vis the crime of
aggression).
31.

See infra text accompanying notes 153-156.
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comer at that, 32 it was left to France and the United Kingdom (the P2) to formally defend postwar privileges. Legal arguments in favor
of Council exclusivity in the aggression realm proved unconvincing
in light of contemporary UN practice. 33 Policy arguments, in turn,
were never persuasively developed and were in any case undermined
by the Security Council's checkered history of responding to breaches of the peace. 34 States that in the past might have been convinced
to endorse a strong, if not exclusive, role for the Council instead espoused voluntarist attitudes that undercut the preferences of the P-5.
The coalition of GRULAC and African States Parties ostensibly had overwhelming numbers on its side if the decision came down
to a vote. Nonetheless, the threat of a contentious vote in Kampala
was ultimately defused given the demographics of the Conference, 35
the governing voting rules and principled arguments that adding such
a controversial crime to the ICC Statute should be accomplished by
consensus or not at all. 36 The ICC Statute makes clear that amend32. The United States did not start participating in the formal negotiations until
November 2009. See generally Bill Marmon, As ICC Starts Major Review, Can U.S. and
EU

Cooperate?, EUR.

AFF.

(June-July

2010),

http://www.europeaninstitute.org/

201006041034/June-July-20 10/as-icc-starts-major-review-can-us-and-eu-cooperate.html
("All their political skills will be needed if the U.S. is to manage its nuanced diplomatic
goals in Kampala and beyond without appearing hypocritical, or opportunistic, or
obstructive, or unilaterally hubristic-or all of the above."). This renewed engagement
replaced the overt hostility toward the court that characterized the first term of the George
W. Bush Administration. See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of
America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. (SuPP.) 381, 384, 404
(2002).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 225-234.
34. See Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, the InternationalCriminal Court, and the
Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive I the Security Council's Power To Determine
Aggression?, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) ("The Security Council is a political
body, and it has used the term 'aggression' in its resolutions in a political way. The Security

Council has not found the existence of aggression where aggression was most obvious, and
it has found aggression in borderline cases.").
35.

See Niels Blokker & Claus Krep, A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of

Aggression: Impressionsfrom Kampala, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 889, 891 (2010) (noting the
lack of a credible threat of a vote); see also Delegations to the Review Conference of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. RC/TNF.I (Aug. 26, 2010)
(listing delegations present in Kampala), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp
docs/RC2010 /RC-INF. I-reissued-ENG-FRA-SPA.pdf.
36. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement at the Review
Conference of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda (June 4, 2010), available
[hereinafter
Koh,
U.S.
at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/ 142665.htm
Intervention]; see also Blokker & Krep, supranote 35, at 891 (noting that most states agreed
that a vote would be divisive).
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ments to the treaty are ideally to be approved by consensus, but the
relevant provision also allows amendments to be adopted by a twothird majority of the Assembly of States Parties in the event that a
consensus cannot be reached. 37 There were compelling arguments
that the aggression amendments in particular should be adopted by
consensus rather than through a contested vote, especially where a
raw "majority rules" approach determined the resort to a vote as well
as the result. This question of procedure was framed as crucial to the
court's and the amendments' very legitimacy in light of the larger
principle that reaching consensus is the only valid decision-making
rule for issues of constitutional import such as the adding of a complex and controversial crime to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 38 Otherwise, it was argued that the amendments' divisive provenance would call every prosecution for aggression into question.
The United States emerged as the strongest proponent for a consensus outcome. 39 Many delegations echoed this call, although often in
the same breath in which they pleaded for compromise. In the background of this meta-conversation about process, the history of the
Rome Conference loomed. There, the United States was marginalized when it proposed an ill-advised last minute amendment to the
final package. The amendment failed on a resounding no action motion, and again on an unrecorded but easily deciphered end-ofproceedings vote that clearly revealed the extent of the United
States's isolation. 40
The threat of a vote hung over the Kampala proceedings like
Damocles' sword, although it was never entirely clear whether even a
37. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 121(3) ("The adoption of an amendment at a
meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus
cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties."); see also I.C.C. Res.
ICC-ASP/6/Res.2, Annex IV, Draft Rules of Procedure of the Review Conference, R. 49, 51,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP6-Res-02ENG.pdf [hereinafter Review Conference Rules].
38. Koh, U.S. Intervention, supra note 36 ("In the history of the International Criminal
Court, the definitions of all of the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction and all of the
elements of these crimes have been adopted by consensus. We should not deviate from that
decision-making principle for these even more sensitive and highly-charged offenses.").
39.

See, e.g., id.

40. See Beth Van Schaack et al., InternationalService for Human Rights Dossier on

the International Criminal Court 3 n.14 (Santa Clara Sch. of Law Legal Stud. Res. Papers
Ser., Working Paper No. 10-07, June 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1628317; Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 21, at 77 (recounting votes);
William K. Lietzau, InternationalCriminalLav After Rome: Concernsfrom a U.S. Military
Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 119-20 (2001) (describing U.S.

marginalization in multilateral treaty negotiations).
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vote could result in a conclusive outcome. According to the rules, an
amendment could be adopted by two-thirds of the full membership of
the Assembly of States Parties. 4 1 With 111 States Parties, a twothirds vote required the consent of 74 States Parties. On June 9, the
Credentials Committee reported that 72 States Parties had submitted
the necessary credentials to be entitled to vote, if necessary. 42 Latvia
subsequently submitted its credentials. 43 Mid-conference, five states
in arrears-Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti
and Nauru-were given exemptions from lost voting rights. 44 Additional states submitted "information concerning the appointment of
representatives," bringing the number of potential voting states up to
85, which still meant that virtual unanimity would be required to pass
anything with a vote. 45 Without the credible threat of a vote, mere
numbers alone were insufficient to enable the coalition to assert its
full weight against the enduring muscle of the permanent members of
the Security Council and their few influential and vocal allies or to
sway states that wanted a solution the P-5 could accept. 46
Furthermore, there was the lingering uncertainty about how
deep the support for making the prohibition of aggression operational
really was among ostensibly concurring delegations. Nor was it clear
what instructions delegates in Kampala would receive if they were
forced to call their capitals in the event of a vote. Although key
groups within the coalition-such as the Union of South American
Nations, under the de facto leadership of Brazil, and the so-called
"African Group" of States Parties, led by South Africa-espoused
consistent support for expansive aggression amendments, certain coalition members at times seemed to approach the negotiations primarily as an opportunity to score points on a larger Security Council reform agenda. Brazil in particular was clearly endeavoring to play a
41. See Review Conference Rules, supra note 37.
42. See Valerie Oosterveld, Final Day in Kampala, INTLAWGRRLS (June 11, 2010),
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/06/final-day-in-kampala.html;
Astrid
Reisinger
Coracini, The International Criminal Court's Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of
Aggression-atLast .. . in Reach . .. over Some, 2 GOTTINGEN J. INT'L L. 745, 764 n.109
(2010) (discussing credentials).
43.

Oosterveld, supra note 42.

44.

Id.

45. Id.
46. The Rules of the Review Conference, however, also seemed to allow provisions to
be adopted piecemeal by a vote of two-thirds of those present and voting rather than twothirds of the full Assembly of States Parties. Review Conference Rules, supra note 37, R.
53, 55, 60. This presented the distasteful outcome whereby each individual provision would
be adopted by two-thirds of those present and voting, but the final package would fail.
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big power role in opposition to the P-5, perhaps to burnish its reputation with the states of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement.
In the end, all sides recognized that their negotiating leverage
was at its maximum in Kampala, under the crucible of waning time
and pressing travel schedules. No one seemed to relish taking these
issues up again or risking a re-negotiation of settled issues in the fall
at the Assembly of States Parties in New York. This was the case
even though the voting dynamics would likely have been more favorable for those delegations that seemingly favored the full and immediate implementation of the crime.
With a contested vote effectively foreclosed, compromise became inevitable. In the end, the pro-codification coalition abandoned
its ideals and backed a regime of state consent with retrograde elements-one that completely insulates the nationals of Non-Party
States from prosecution and allows States Parties to opt out of the
crime entirely-in order to defeat one controlled by the Security
Council. This concession attests to the extreme-if not irrationalantipathy felt by many states toward the Council. Speaking through
France and the United Kingdom-the only members of the P-5 with
the power to break consensus-the P-5 reluctantly assented to the final package. 47 The next Part recounts in greater detail how this result
was ultimately achieved. It is followed by an analysis of the adopted
and rejected provisions with reference to key principles of public international law.
II. NEGOTIATION CHRONOLOGY IN KAMPALA

To a certain degree, the story of the aggression negotiations in
Kampala is a story about jurisdiction rather than definition.
Although all elements of the aggression provisions were open to negotiation in Kampala, the definition of the crime had strong support.
Even France and the United Kingdom had ceased their efforts to revise the definition under consideration, although they later argued
47. Blokker & Krep3, supra note 35, at 890. The authors note that:
It is much to be welcomed that the United Kingdom and France eventually
decided not to block the consensus on the basis of their claim to a Security
Council monopoly. It would be mistaken, however, to interpret this final move
as the acceptance of a weakening of the paramount Security Council's powers
in the field of international peace and security. By eventually refraining from
overstretching their competences, the United Kingdom and France have made a
wise decision which can only be conducive to strengthening the acceptance of
their privileged position as pennanent members of the Security Council.
Id. at 894.
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that their silence should not be construed to indicate support for the
text. Accordingly, the negotiations up to and during the Review
Conference focused almost exclusively on the jurisdictional regime
to govern the crime, although the United States did attempt to massage the definition with interpretive understandings. After a brief
discussion of the final definitional provisions, this Part discusses the
open jurisdictional issues to lay the foundation for understanding the
dynamics of the Kampala negotiations.
A. The Definition of the Crime Priorto Kampala

By June 2008, the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression had removed all brackets 48 from the definition of aggression contained in draft Article 8bis. 49 The Working Group submitted
this definition to the ASP in February 2009.50 The definition resisted
48. Brackets in a treaty indicate contested or tentative text. See Int'l Criminal Court,
Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its Resumed 6th Sess., June 2-6, 2008,
Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Attachment, Drafi
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/6/20/Add.1, Annex 11 (2008). The aggression amendments have been denominated
Article 8bis (definition) and Articles 15bis and 15ter (jurisdiction). See Aggression
Resolution, supra note 1. All other Articles referenced herein appear within the Statute as
adopted at Rome in 1998.
49. The definition of the crime appears in Article 8bis:
For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression .
Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex 1,art. 8bis(1)-(2).
50. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th Sess.
(1st & 2d Resumptions), Jan. 19-23, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Report of the Special Working Group
on the Crime of/Aggression, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, 2d Resumption, Annex II
(2009),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/ICC-ASP-7-20-Add. 1%
20English.pdf; see also Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on
its 7th Sess. (1st & 2d Resumptions), Jan. 19-23, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Proposalsfor a
Provision on Aggression Elaborated by the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, Appendix, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2, Annex 1 (2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/ASP7R2/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCA-2-ENG.pdf.
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amendments from this point forward.51 Although the absence of
brackets suggested consensus, several states remained ill at ease with
the definition, most vocally the United States once it began participating in the aggression negotiations in November 2009. These uneasy states maintained that Article 8bis(2) is worded in such a way 52
that it deems any violation of the territorial integrity, political independence or sovereignty of another state, as well as any use of armed
force that is inconsistent with the UN Charter, to be an "act of aggression." 53 Accordingly, the mere crossing of an international border by military forces without the consent of the neighboring state,
for example, could be condemned as an "act of aggression," regardless of the circumstances, the gravity or consequences of the state's
actions or the motive/intent behind the operation. 54 Because the definition of the crime contains no express reference to codified or uncodified exceptions to the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of
armed force, such an act could serve as the predicate to a prosecution
for the "crime of aggression."55 This is notwithstanding that both Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Resolution 3314 envision unlawful
uses of force as existing along a continuum, with aggression at the far
end of egregiousness.

51. Christian Wenaweser, Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The
Chair's Perspective, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 883, 883 (2010).

52. See Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex 11, art. 8bis, Elements, para. 3
(defining "act of aggression" as "the use of anned force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.").
53. This language, with the exception of the added reference to "sovereignty" and the
deletion of the concept of a threat to peace, is drawn from Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
54. The elements of the crime of aggression better link the definition of act of
aggression to the UN Charter system when they state that "[t]he perpetrator was aware of the
factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed force [i.e., the act of
aggression] was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations."
Aggression
Resolution, supranote 1, Annex II, art. 8bis, Elements, para. 4.
55.

Article 8bis(1) defines the crime of aggression as

the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of
a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Id., Annex I, art. 8bis(1).
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For any act to support a prosecution of the crime of aggression, it must satisfy the requirements set forth in Article 8bis(1) of
the amendments. That provision lists a number of acts of aggression
that fall within the prohibition against aggression if they constitute a
"manifest" violation of the UN Charter. 56 The term "manifest,"
which was never defined, emerged as a compromise modifier to
bridge a gap between two groups of delegates. One group of delegates wanted no threshold at all, on the theory that every act of aggression should be subject to prosecution. 57 The other group of delegates wanted a higher threshold, one that would limit prosecutions to
"flagrant" breaches of the Charter,58 wars of aggression, 59 "unlawful"
uses of force or acts of aggression geared toward occupying or annexing territory. Germany, for example, supported a high threshold
for the crime, requiring proof that the act of aggression had "the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the
territory of such other State or part thereof by the armed forces of the
attacking State." 60
Without a consensus as to the definition, the term "manifest"
remained controversial and indeterminate. 61 To some negotiators, it
56. Id., Annex I, art. 8bis(2)(a)-(g).
57. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Grp. on the
Crime of Aggression 5th Sess., Nov. 23-Dec. 1, 2006, Informal Inter-SessionalMeeting of
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1,
18 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-SWGCA-INFIEnglish.pdf.
58. See id. 18-20 (summarizing debates over the term "flagrant" versus "manifest").
The term "flagrant" disappeared in 2007, apparently because it was considered too high a
barrier to prosecution. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th
Sess., Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression,
16-18, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex II (2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35_English.pdf (discussing
the term "manifest").
59. See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Grp.
on the Crime of Aggression 6th Sess., Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, Informal Inter-Sessional
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 57, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/6/SWGCA/TNF.1
(July 25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF-1_English.pdf (discussing debates over
including reference to "war of aggression").
60. See, e.g., Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Proposal
Submitted by Germany, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13 (July 30, 1999), available at
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/223/37/pdf/N9922337.pdf?Open
Element.
61. Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests one
useful definition in connection with provisions governing treaty ratifications in violation of
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referred to the degree of clarity or ambiguity surrounding the illegality of the act of aggression; to others, it denoted some level of seriousness, in terms of the impugned act's scale or consequences, or
willfulness on the part of the actor; 62 to still others, it was susceptible
to both interpretations, the so-called "double function." 63 The definitions of "act of aggression" and "crime of aggression" were thus
open to endless interpretation and were potentially quite expansive.
At the same time, consensus on the text rendered them close to sacrosanct. As a result, detractors of the amendments shifted their attention to tightening the jurisdictional regime.
B. The State ofPlay Vis-i-Vis JurisdictionPriorto Kampala

At the Resumed Eighth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties held March 22-25, 2010 in New York, H.R.H. Prince Zeid
Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein-Jordan's Ambassador to the United States
and Mexico, first president of the ICC Assembly of States Parties,
Chair of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression and
chair of the negotiations in Kampala-circulated a "Non-Paper" in an
attempt to encapsulate the outstanding issues concerning the jurisdictional conditions for the crime of aggression. 64 The text was based
on the assumption, virtually constant throughout the negotiations,
that all three trigger mechanisms (state, prosecutor and Security
Council referrals) would apply to the crime of aggression. 65 Two sets
domestic law: "[a] violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with nonnal practice and in good faith."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980), art. 46 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
62. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 4th
Sess., Nov. 28 Dec. 3, 2005, Discussion Paper3, Definition ofAggression in the Context of
the Statute of the ICC,
3, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex IID, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D224718C-39EF-477C-BO28-F434F4BF78AE/0
/Annexes.pdf (discussing alternative interpretations of "manifest").
63.

Claus Kref3 & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime

ofAggression, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1193 n.55 (2010).

64. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its Resumed
8th Sess., Mar. 22-25, 2010, Non-Paperby the Chairman on Outstanding Issues Regarding
the Conditionsfor the Exercise of Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20/Add. 1, Appendix
1, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP8/OR/OR-ASPR8-ENG.
ANNEXES.pdf. Non-papers are unofficial documents, not intended to be actionable, that
aim to consolidate the negotiations and gauge support for particular fornulations or concepts
in an infornal way.
65. Id. at 2.
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of issues remained contentious: first, the applicable amendment governing the entry into force mechanism, which also impacted the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction; and second, the appropriate filter mechanisms for aggression prosecutions triggered by a state
referral or the Prosecutor's exercise of his proprio motu powers.
Given that these two issues were central to the operationalization of
the crime of aggression, the possibility that the Review Conference
might result in a definition-only outcome hovered in the background
of the negotiations. This would have been viewed as a welcome conclusion by some participants, but as a complete failure by others, given that the definition already enjoyed considerable support going into
Kampala.
1. The Debates over the Entry into Force Provisions and
Jurisdictional Preconditions Before Kampala
The first contentious jurisdictional issue arose due to the interplay between Article 12 of the ICC Statute, entitled "Preconditions
to the Exercise of Jurisdiction," 66 and Article 121, entitled "Amendments." 67 The latter Article contains two separate regimes governing
the entry into force of amendments to the Statute. 68 Jurisdiction over
the current ICC crimes is governed by Article 12(2), which provides
that absent a Security Council referral under Article 13(b), 69 the court
may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory or
by the nationals of States Parties. 70 Article 12 is the product of a ma-

66. Article 12(2) of the ICC Statute, supra note 3, reads:
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c) [governing State Party referrals
and proprio motu actions], the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or
more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred
or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of
registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
67. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 121.
68. See infla text accompanying notes 67-100.
69. Pursuant to Articles 13(b) and 12(2), the Security Council can refer a situation to
the court regardless of whether the state of nationality of the accused or the territorial state is
a party to the Statute. ICC Statute, supra note 3, arts. 13(b),12(2); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1593,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC).
70. The granting of non-consensual jurisdiction to the court over crimes committed on
the territory of States Parties by nationals of Non-Party States has been described as
"innovative, even revolutionary." See Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal
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jor compromise achieved at Rome between states advocating a pure
consent-based approach to all crimes-that would have required the
state of nationality of the accused to be a party to the Statute before a
prosecution could go forward absent action by the Security Council 7 1-and states advocating a form of "universal jurisdiction." 72
This latter approach would have enabled the court to prosecute an individual regardless of whether any of the relevant states (the state of
nationality of the accused or victim, the territorial state or the custodial state) was a party to the Statute. 73 The default preconditions
contained in Article 12 were destined to work somewhat differently
with respect to the crime of aggression, given that aggression is frequently committed on the territories of both the aggressor and the
victim states. That said, the very application of Article 12(2) to the
crime of aggression was called into question by the provisions governing the amendment of the Statute.
Specifically, Article 121(5) governs amendments to Articles 5
(listing crimes within the jurisdiction of the court), 6 (defining genoCourt and the Sovereign State, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 185,

198 (Ige F. Dekker & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004).
71. The United States long argued that Article 12 of the ICC Statute which, as quoted
in supra note 66, allows the ICC to assert jurisdiction over the national of a Non-State Party
accused of committing crimes on the territory of a State Party, violates the fundamental
principle of treaty law; that is, the principle that a treaty cannot "create either obligations or
rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 34; see
Sharon A. Williams, Article 12, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note

16, at 329, 336 ("In cases where the Security Council does not trigger the Court's
jurisdiction, the United States supported as fundamental the consent of the territorial State
and the State of nationality of the accused person, or at a minimum only the consent of the
State of nationality.") (citations removed, emphasis in original). This argument has always
been controversial and inevitably answered with the observation that the ICC does not
exercise jurisdiction over states per se, but rather over individuals. See ANTHONY AUST,
MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 260 (2007) (noting that a national of a third state may

be subject to a treaty if on the territory of a treaty party). The crime of aggression puts the
United States's Vienna Convention argument on stronger footing given that adjudicating the
crime requires the ICC to declare the illegality of a state's actions as a predicate to the
prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression.
72. This designation was somewhat inaccurate, as universal jurisdiction generally
denotes a species of domestic jurisdiction, rather than international jurisdiction. However,
international jurisdiction is often conceptualized as a form of delegated jurisdiction. In this
way, an international court unencumbered by jurisdictional preconditions would be
analogous to a domestic court exercising universal jurisdiction. See Williams, supra note
71, at 332-33 (discussing Gennan universal jurisdiction proposal).
73. Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 21, at 83 (discussing origins of Article 12
compromise).
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cide), 7 (defining crimes against humanity) and 8 (defining war
crimes). 74 It reads: "Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this
Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments
of ratification or acceptance." 75 All other amendments are governed
by Article 121(4), which reads: "Except as provided in paragraph 5,
an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of
them." 76 The question thus presented was whether the inclusion of a
definition of aggression (which was to be inserted at Article 8bis) and
a dedicated jurisdictional regime (which was to be inserted at Article
15bis) were "amendments" to Articles 5 through 8 governed by subsection (5) or more general amendments governed by sub-section (4)
of Article 121. This distinction was significant because amendments
under the two regimes become operational differently vis-d-vis States
Parties and thus interact differently with Article 12(2)'s jurisdictional
preconditions.
Under the 121(5) regime, the aggression amendments would
incrementally enter into force for the purposes of state referrals and
proprio motu prosecutions a year after the relevant States Parties ratified or accepted the amendments.77 While it was accepted that jurisdiction would exist over a crime of aggression committed by the national of a State Party that had accepted the aggression amendments,
the second sentence of Article 121(5) introduced an element of state
consent. It provides: "In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that
State Party's nationals or on its territory." 78 This reference to consent
confused issues considerably and created uncertainty over when, if

74. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 5.
75. Id. art. 121(5).
76. Id. art. 121(4).
77. It was always understood that ratification of the amendments was irrelevant in
cases in which the Security Council triggered a prosecution. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly
of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th Sess., Nov. 14-22, 2008, Report ofthe Special
Working Group on the Crime ofAggression,
8-10, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20, Annex III
(2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int /iccdocs/asp-docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20Ann.I%20English.pdf; see also Coracini, supra note 42, at 755 (noting that a referral by
the Security Council would not depend on the consent of any of the states concerned).
78. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 121(5).
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ever, jurisdiction would exist over the nationals of States Parties that
had not ratified or accepted the aggression amendments.
Two competing interpretations were put forward for the language in the second sentence: the Negative Understanding and the
Positive Understanding. According to the so-called Negative Understanding, if a State Party did not accept the amendments, the court
could not exercise jurisdiction over aggression crimes committed in
that state's territory or by that state's nationals, even if the putative
victim state had accepted the aggression amendments. 9 An argument could be made that the Negative Understanding also required
that the victim state accept the amendments, since the act of aggression would have been committed on its territory.80 The Negative
Understanding would also bar the prosecution of nationals of nonconsenting States Parties who committed aggression on behalf of another state, for example, as mercenaries.
If the Negative Understanding governed the aggression
amendments, States Parties would be able to immunize their nationals from prosecution for aggression, as well as prevent the prosecution of crimes of aggression committed in their territories, by simply
not ratifying or not accepting the amendments. By contrast, the aggression provisions would apply to Non-Party States by operation of
Article 12(2) to the extent either that non-party nationals committed
the crime of aggression on the territory of a consenting State Party or
that a crime of aggression was committed on non-party territory by
the nationals of a State Party that had accepted the amendments.81
From a cynical perspective, the Negative Understanding provided an
incentive for potential aggressor states to join the court, because they
would be in a better position to avoid the aggression provisions
through non-ratification than Non-Party States, which would not
have the opportunity to reject the amendments. The Negative Understanding provided no incentive, however, for potential aggressor
States Parties (or States Parties opposed to the crime of aggression)
79. See Int'l Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, May 31 -June
11, 2010, Conference Room Paper on the Crime ofAggression, U.N. Doc. RC/WGCA/1,

Annex III (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/RC2010
/RC-WGCA-l-ENG.pdf [hereinafter May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper] (setting forth
proposed "[u]nderstandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression" for inclusion in final Resolution
adopting the aggression amendments).
80. Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute's Amendment on the Crime of Aggression:
Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 85 n.148

(2011).
81.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2).
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to ratify or accept the aggression amendments. The aggression provisions could thus have become a dead letter if the majority of States
Parties simply failed to accept or ratify them once they were adopted
by the Assembly of States Parties. States opposed to the crime of aggression could limit the impact of the new aggression provisions by
encouraging states to decline to adopt the amendments, thus immunizing the nationals of non-ratifying states and those territories from
the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime.
By contrast, the so-called Positive Understanding of the second sentence of Article 121(5) reflected the default regime in Article 12(2) and provided that all that mattered was that the victim state
had ratified or accepted the aggression amendments, regardless of
whether the aggressor state was a party or had accepted the amendments. 82 This Understanding required the text of the second sentence
of Article 121(5) to be manipulated so that it could be read as an affirmative statement: if a State Party has accepted the amendment,
then the court can exercise its jurisdiction over crimes of aggression
committed on its territory. If this were the intent of the parties, of
course, it would have made more sense to word it as such. By this
approach, the court could exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed on the territory of any State Party that accepted
the aggression amendments, regardless of whether the putative aggressor state was a State Party or had ratified or accepted the
amendments. The Positive Understanding strained the text of that
provision almost to the breaking point. It nonetheless received significant public support as a fallback position among negotiating
states that actually favored the application of Article 121(4) to the
aggression amendments, which would operationalize the crime once
seven-eighths of all States Parties ratified the amendments. 83
The amendments would become operational more slowly, if
ever, under Article 121(4) than under Article 121(5), for either interpretation. Once seven-eighths of the States Parties have accepted the
amendments via instruments of ratification or acceptance, the court
could begin to accept state or proprio motu referrals of cases involving acts of aggression committed on the territory, or by the nationals,
of all States Parties pursuant to the standard operation of Article 12.84
82. Id. art. 121(5).
83. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th Sess.
(1st & 2d Resumptions), Jan. 19-23, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Report of the Special Working Group
on the Crime ofAggression,
31-37, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (2009), available
athttp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/ASP7R2/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCA-2-ENG.pdf.
84. It was never fully clarified whether Security Council referrals could begin
immediately upon adoption of the amendments; presumably the supporters of Article 121(4)
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Thus, all States Parties would be equally bound by the aggression
provisions once seven-eighths of the Parties (98 states given 114
States Parties as of October 12, 201085) accepted them, and no opt
out or withholding of consent was available.
Under an Article 121(4) regime, once the aggression amendments become operational, the only way for States Parties to avoid
prosecutions for acts of aggression committed on their own territory
would be by withdrawing from the Statute altogether, in accordance
with Articles 121(6) and 127 of the Statute. 86 Even then, withdrawing states-like other Non-Party States-would remain subject to the
new aggression provisions to the extent that their nationals committed aggression on the territory of other States Parties as understood
by Article 12(2). With the Article 121(4) amendment framework, an
opportunity existed for obstructionist states to block the aggression
provisions from entering into force altogether by preventing the necessary seven-eighths support for the new provisions. Powerful states
intent on sabotaging the amendments would have to convince only
fourteen or so holdouts to decline ratification or acceptance, thus
rendering the amendments stillborn.
The two amendment regimes impacted Non-Party States differently, which further complicated matters. To apply the aggression
amendments to Non-Party States pursuant to Article 121(4) would
have been easy: once those amendments entered into force with seven-eighths ratification, the nationals of Non-Party States could be
prosecuted for the crime of aggression pursuant to the standard preconditions of jurisdiction set forth in Article 12(2). Non-Party States
would be in the same position as States Parties in terms of their vulnerability to aggression prosecutions of their nationals. By contrast,
Article 121(5) created an anomaly whereby States Parties could exempt their nationals from the aggression provisions by simply failing
to adopt or ratify the amendments.87 The Negative Understanding in
would insist that Security Council referrals would also have to await the seven-eighths
ratification.
85.

See The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,

http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
86. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 121(6) ("If an amendment has been accepted by
seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with paragraph 4, any State Party which has
not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with immediate effect,
notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by giving
notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment.").
87. Concerns were also expressed that newcomers that joined the Statute postamendment would not benefit from the opt-out option and would take the Statute as they
found it. Article 40(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, suggests
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particular allowed potential aggressor states to avoid the crime of aggression so long as they were already party to the Statute. Non-Party
States, on the other hand, would not have any opportunity to opt out
of the aggression provisions by non-ratification. Arguments were
made and generally accepted that principles of non-discrimination
would suggest that Non-Party States should not be worse off than
States Parties vis-d-vis the amendments.88 States argued in favor of
the Negative and Positive Understandings of Article 121(5) in order
to address the issue of Non-Party States in the aggression context as
well.
It was clear from the provisions' wording that the more stringent Article 121(4) procedure was the default procedure, subject only
to the exception set forth in Article 121(5).89 A strong textual argument existed that the aggression amendments should be governed by
Article 121(4). First, the inclusion of the crime of aggression required a new Article 8bis, which is not an amendment to Article 8
governing war crimes but rather a new provision that could not be
sequentially numbered, as well as a new Article 15bis. Second, Article 121(5) seems to address the scenario whereby the ICC Statute's
existing penal definitions were amended after states had already
joined the treaty, thus unsettling states' established expectations
about the reach of the court, whereas Article 121(4) addresses the
other amendments to other aspects of the ICC Statute. By this logic,
the addition of a new crime altogether should involve Article 121(4)
and require a high degree of state support before the new crime may
become prosecutable.

that newcomers may be given the option of acceding to the original version of the treaty
rather than the amended version:
5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of
the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by
that State:
(a) be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and
(b) be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any
party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.
Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 40(5).
88. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th
Sess. (1st & 2d Resumptions), Jan. 19-23, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Report of/the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, 28 (2009), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, 2d
Resumption, Annex 11, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs /ICC-ASP-720-Add.1%20English.pdf (discussing equal treatment of Non-Party States); see also
Coracini, supra note 42, at 760 (noting the "previously determined policy consideration to
treat non-State Parties and States Parties [that do not accept] the amendment equally").
89. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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On the other hand, the legislative history of the ICC Statute
somewhat favored considering Article 121(5) as the lex specialis for
any amendments to the substantive criminal provisions.90 Until well
into the 1998 Rome Conference, the definitions of all the crimes had
been contained in Article 5; this suggested that adding the crime of
aggression would have necessitated an amendment to Article 5 as
understood by Article 121(5). It was only late in the negotiations that
the Drafting Committee disaggregated Article 5 and gave each of the
three crimes its own dedicated treaty provision. 91 The amendment
procedures were negotiated and drafted by a different committee, and
the last minute change to Article 5 was not reflected in the amendment provisions. As a result, the amendment provisions do not
cleanly track the ultimate structure of the treaty provisions outlining
the court's substantive crimes. 92
Besides the arguments that viewed the two amendment regimes as mutually exclusive, 93 less compelling arguments posited
that neither amendment regime was applicable. 94 Some states put
forth the view that Article 5(2) of the Statute, which contemplates the
inclusion of a definition of aggression, refers to the adoption of a
"provision" rather than "amendment." 95 By this argument, the inclusion of a definition of the crime of aggression would not require ratification by States Parties as would an "amendment" in the sense of

90. See Gaja, supra note 20, at 440 (assuming applicability of Article 121(5) to
aggression); Trahan, supra note 80, at 85 n. 148 (noting that Article 121(5) was appropriate
to amend the Court's core crimes).
91.

See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International

Criminal Court, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMPILATION OF UNITED
NATIONS DOCUMENTS AND DRAFT ICC STATUTE BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 7,

12-26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998) (reproducing an earlier version of Article 5, which
contained draft definitions of the three core crimes plus aggression and terrorism). Indeed,
the version of Article 121(5) in the Statute adopted at Rome erroneously referred only to
amendments to Article 5 of the Statute. The final report, however, added reference to
Articles 6 through 8. See Roger S. Clark, Article 121: Amendments, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 16, at 1265, 1269-

70.
92.

Lietzau, supra note 40, at 132.

93. See Robert Manson, Identi/ing the Rough Edges of the Kampala Compromise, 21
CRIM. L.F. 417, 422 (2010) (arguing that the Statute provides for "two separate, distinct and
mutually exclusive mechanisms, for the acceptance and subsequent entry into force of the
Statute.").
94. KreB & von Holtzendorff, supra note 63, at 1196-99 (discussing various
interpretations of the amendment provisions).
95. See supra note 18.
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Article 121(4) or (5), because the new text would simply complete
the job that had been left unfinished at Rome. 96 This argument
would have dodged the question of which sub-paragraph of Article
121 applied and rendered the aggression provisions immediately operational once they were adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at
the Review Conference. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the
delegates participating in the Rome Conference would have written
such a blank check to their successors, especially given the controversy surrounding the crime of aggression. An alternative position
advanced was that the aggression amendments should enter into force
pursuant to a complex combination of the two amendment schemes. 97
In particular, it was suggested that the definition of aggression and
related amendments such as the leadership clause in Article 25 would
become operational pursuant to Article 121(5), and that Article
121(4) would govern the jurisdictional amendments.98 Although
several disaggregated proposals were put forth in Kampala, in the
end, the Assembly proceeded on the understanding that one amendment regime or the other should apply to the entire package to ensure
the unity of the amendments. Remarkably, the question of which
amendment regime would govern the addition of the crime of aggression was not resolved or even appreciably considered by the end of
the Rome Conference. This occurred in part because the final package-which contained the aggression compromise and the amendment provisions-pulled together the work of different working
groups and was presented in a "take-it-or-leave-it" fashion to states in
the final hours of the Rome Conference.9 9 This amendment conundrum had received some attention at prior sessions of the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression and the Assembly of
States Parties, but there was no consensus on exactly how it should
be resolved. 00 And so, the operative amendment process remained
an open-if at the time peripheral-issue leading up to Kampala.
96.

June 2005 SWGCA Report, supra note 20, 11 14-15.

97. See Trahan, supra note 80, at 65 (noting that such a system would be "hopelessly
complex").
98. See Stefan Barriga & Leena Grover, Negotiating the Kampala Compromise on the
Crime of Aggression (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (noting that the ABS
Proposal applied both 121(4) and (5) to different provisions of the proposal).
99. June 2005 SWGCA Report, supra note 20, 5 (noting that aggression had been
incorporated in Article 5 at a late phase after the completion of the negotiations and drafting
of Article 121).
100. See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its
7th Sess., Nov. 14-22, 2008, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (2008), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20, Annex 111, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int
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2. The Debates over Jurisdictional Filters Pre-Kampala
The second major contentious issue contained in the Chair's
Non-Paper issued shortly before the Kampala Conference concerned
the appropriate jurisdictional filters for state referrals orpropriomotu
investigations involving the crime of aggression. Since the early
days of the aggression negotiations, it was posited as a matter of policy that the court should be subject to some mechanism that would
allow the prosecution of individuals only following a prior determination that the state in question had committed an act of aggression.
The International Law Commission originally designated the Security Council as the entity that would serve this filtering function,101 a
role that was under consideration in Rome. 102 Later, states proposed
more filter options for consideration, even though not all states
agreed on the need for any filter at all. 103 The P-5 and several other
states favored the ILC approach designating the Security Council as
an exclusive and determinative filter. Under this system-in the absence of a prior Security Council determination that the state in question had committed an act of aggression, prosecution would be
barred. This approach would have required the Council not only to
muster the necessary majority but also to gain the affirmative vote or
abstention of the P-5.104 If the Security Council did not make the

/iccdocs/asp-docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20-Ann.11120English.pdf (recounting negotiations
over the correct interpretation and application of Article 121). Article 119 of the ICC
Statute, supra note 3, allows the Assembly of States Parties to refer to the International
Court of Justice disputes over the interpretation or application of the Statute that cannot be
resolved by negotiation; however, this option, which would have delayed the addition of the
aggression provisions even more, was never seriously considered.
101. See, e.g., Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, art. 23(2), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser. A/1994/Add. I (pt. 2), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments
/english/draft%/20articles/7_4_1994.pdf ("A complaint of or directly related to an act of
aggression may not be brought under this Statute unless the Security Council has first
determined that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the
complaint.").
102. See, e.g., Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, art. 10, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 119, 132-33 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998)

(contemplating a filter role for the Security Council for the crime of aggression).
103.

See, e.g., June 2005 SWGCA Report, supra note 20,

63-74.

104. See U.N. Charter art. 27, 1| 3 ("Decisions of the Security Council on all other
matters shall be made by an affinnative vote of nine members including the concurring votes
of the pennanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."); see also
Constantin A. Stavropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by PermanentMembers
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necessary determination, no aggression charges could be brought,
although the Prosecution could investigate other ICC crimes committed within the same situation. This approach was premised on the
underlying argument that the Council enjoys the primary, if not exclusive, role of addressing threats to and breaches of the peace in the
UN Charter system. 0 5
Two forms of a Security Council filter were under consideration during the drafting negotiations. One form of filter was premised on the Council's making an express determination that a state
had committed an act of aggression. The second filter, the so-called
"green light option," would have allowed the Council to approve a
prosecution through adoption of a Chapter VII resolution requesting
the Prosecutor to proceed but would not have necessitated an affirmative aggression determination by the Council. 106 Some proponents of
Security Council control over aggression prosecutions argued that the
Charter required that the court only be empowered to proceed on the
basis of an express determination by the Council and that the green
light option undermined this mandate. 107 There was some question
about whether the veto should apply to a green light resolution, although it was clear that members of the P-5 would not easily relinquish their veto rights in the aggression context.1 08 Proponents of the
of the Security Council Under Article 27(3), 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 742-47 (1967)

(describing the established practice of the Security Council to treat a voluntary abstention as
not tantamount to a veto).
105. See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Grp.
on the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, Informal Inter-Sessional
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1,
25 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF-1 English.pdf
106. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Nov. 30-Dec. 14,
2007, Report of/the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/6/SWGCA/1,
35 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp
docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-lEnglish.pdf (discussing Chairman's formulation of
the green light proposal).
107.

See in/ra text accompanying notes 207-210 (articulating the exclusivity thesis).

108. It could be argued that a resolution simply allowing the prosecutor to proceed
would constitute a procedural decision subject to Article 27, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter
and thus be exempt from the veto. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 2 ("Decisions of the
Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members."). If this interpretation were adopted, nine of fifteen Council members could give
the approval for a prosecution to go forward without the support of the P-5. The express
determination process, by contrast, is more clearly in the nature of a substantive decision.
Making such a determination would require the concurrence (by positive vote or abstention)
of the permanent five. That said, an argument could be made that both processes are
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idea viewed the green light option as giving the Council greater flexibility in responding to threats to the peace, in that the Council could
allow a prosecution to go forward without being locked into an aggression determination. 0 9
Opponents of an exclusive role for the Security Council proposed alternative or back-up filter mechanisms in the event that the
Council failed, or was unable, to make the necessary aggression determination. These alternative filters were designed to ensure that
Security Council inaction would not necessarily be fatal to an investigation into potential crimes of aggression. Candidates for this backup filter included the General Assembly, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the court itself, although the precise details on how
these alternative entities would make such a determination remained
to be worked out.1 10 Beyond these alternative filters, several delegasufficiently substantive to be subject to the veto, especially in light of the fact that both the
Article 13(b) referral and the Article 16 deferral processes are subject to the veto as well. In
any case, the veto is the default procedure within Article 27, paragraph 3, which applies to
"all other matters." Conceptualizing one route to an aggression prosecution that was exempt
from the veto may have placated states that opposed Security Council control over
aggression prosecutions and rendered them more willing to accept an exclusive Security
Council filter. Nonetheless, allowing a route to prosecution that circumvented the veto
would also have potentially subjected nationals of the P-5 to prosecution, which was of
course problematic from the P-5's perspective. Ultimately, it would have been for the
Council to determine whether the green light option was considered a procedural or a
substantive decision. By past practice, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to
whether or not a matter is procedural is treated as a substantive one and is subject to the
veto, which gives rise to the potential for the rarely used but ever-present "double veto." See
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 510
(1995).

109.

See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Nov. 30-Dec. 14,

2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,

38, U.N. Doc.

ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/1
(Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-lEnglish.pdf. It seems clear that the green
light option was a favorite of the Chair of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression. Although the green light option received little actual support over the years of
negotiations, it nonetheless remained in the draft texts under consideration. Id. 36 (noting
that the green light proposal received "limited support"); see also Robert Schaeffer, The
Audacity of Compromise: The UN Security Council and the Pre-Conditions to the Exercise
of Jurisdictionby the InternationalCriminal Court iith Regard to the Crime ofAggression,
9 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 411, 418 (2009) (concluding that the Chair was a proponent of the

proposal).
110.

See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan.

29-Feb. 1, 2007, Report ofthe Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,

23-

41, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex II (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35_English.pdf (discussing filter options); see also
infra text accompanying notes 259-62.
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tions advanced two more permissive options: first, no filter whatsoever; and second, no back-up filter in the event of Security Council
inaction.'"' Although earlier drafts had suggested otherwise,1 12 it
was eventually decided that basic principles of due process demanded that the ICC would not be bound by any determination on aggression by any outside entity.1 13 This was to ensure the independence of
the court, the right of the accused to mount a full defense on every
element of the crime and maintenance of the burden of proof on the
prosecution. 114
In connection with proposals for a non-exclusive filter, Belgium proposed a "red light" function that would have empowered the
Council to stop an aggression investigation or prosecution from going forward altogether.' 15 It was hoped that this function would placate the Security Council by providing it with both a more robust and
more flexible power than the Council's existing deferral power under
Article 16 of the ICC Statute.1 16 This is because Article 16 appears
to require the deferral of an entire case, 117 and not just particular
charges, and it only operates for a year subject to renewal. Although

111. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan. 29-Feb.
1, 2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime olAggression, 25, U.N. Doc.
ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex 11 (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/
library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35 English.pdf.
112. See U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of the Int'l
Criminal Court, paras. 69-71, U.N. Doc. A/50/22; GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (Sept. 6,
1995), available at http://www.undemocracy.com/A-50-22.pdf (discussing debates).
113. See June 2005 SWGCA Report, supra note 20, 71 ("Concerns regarding the
exclusive competence were also based on the fact that permanent members of the Security
Council could veto a proposed determination that an act of aggression had occurred and thus
block criminal investigation and prosecution. Since aggression was a leadership crime, this
could jeopardize the principle that all accused had similar legal resources at their disposal,
irrespective of their nationality.").
114. The final iteration of this principle reads, "A determination of an act of aggression
by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court's own findings under
this Statute." Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 15bis(9); see June 2005
SWGCA Report, supra note 20,
61 (confirming consensus that any Security Council
determination would not be binding).
115. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th
Sess., Nov. 14-22, 2008, Report ofthe Special Working Group on the Crime ofAggression,
21-23 (Mar 13, 2008), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20, Annex 111, available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20-Ann.III%2OEnglish.pdf
116.

See inlra text accompanying notes 269-273.

117.

See supra note 26.
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the red light function had been contemplated by the time of the Review Conference, it had not yet appeared in any consolidated text.' 18
3. State Preferences on the Eve of Kampala
At the close of the Resumed Eighth Session of the Assembly
of States Parties in March 2010, the Chair of the Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression invited States Parties to participate in an informal straw poll to express their preferences on the ideal balance between state consent, Security Council power and judicial independence in the proposed aggression amendments. It referred to several
combinations of the various filter and amendment options. The Chair
organized these options into four boxes displayed graphically below.
Box 1 required not only the acceptance of the aggression
amendments by the aggressor state or states as a jurisdictional precondition, but also a Security Council filter for any aggression charges. This option could be implemented through the Negative Understanding of Article 121(5), which would require that the aggressor
state had ratified or adopted the amendments before any prosecution
could proceed. Box 2 required only the Security Council filter; the
acceptance of the aggression amendments by the victim state was
sufficient as a precondition to jurisdiction by operation of Article
12(2).'19 This option could be implemented by either the Positive
Understanding of Article 121(5) or entry into force pursuant to Article 121(4). Box 3 required acceptance of the aggression amendments
by the putative aggressor state(s) as a precondition to jurisdiction but
contemplated a non-exclusive Security Council filter; that is, either
no filter at all or one or more alternative filters. Box 3 was premised
on the Negative Understanding of Article 121(5). Box 4 did not require consent of the putative aggressor state(s), thus implicating Article 121(4), and envisioned no filter or a non-exclusive Security
Council filter. 120
118. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th
Sess. (1st & 2d Resumptions), Jan. 19-23, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Report of/the Special Working
Group on the Crime of/Aggression, App. 1 (2009), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, 2d
Resumption, Annex 11, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs /asp-docs/ICC-ASP-720-Add. 1%20English.pdf.
119.

See supra text accompanying note 70.

120. These were infonnal compilations and were never published. See Int'l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its Resumed 8th Sess., Mar. 22-25,
2010, Report of/the Working Group on the Review Conference (discussing the options), U.N.
Doc.
ICC-ASP/8/20/Add. 1, Annex
11,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int
/iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP8/OR/OR-ASPR8-ENG.ANNEXES.pdf.
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Straw Poll Results

Box I

Element

Approximate
Numbero.
Supportive
States

Box 2

Consent by
Aggressor
State
Necessary;
Exclusive
Security
Council
Filter for
State
Referrals

No
Necessity of
Aggressor
State
Consent;
Exclusive
Security
Council
Filter for
State
Referrals

Motu

Motu

Investigations

Investigations

11

2

Box 3

Consent of
the
Aggressor
State
Necessary;
No Exclusive
Security
Council
Filter for
State
Referrals
and
and Proprio and Proprio
Proprio
Motu

Investigations

23

Box 4
Neither
Consent
Nor
Exclusive
Security
Council
Filter for
State
Referrals
and
Proprio
Motu

Investigations

32

In the informal vote, 121 participating States Parties showed the
most support for Box 4 (thirty-two states), followed by Box 3 (twenty-three states) and Box 1 (eleven states). Only two States Parties indicated a preference for Box 2. States were evenly split on whether
the consent of the aggressor state should be required (combining
Boxes 1 and 3 and Boxes 2 and 4 both yielded thirty-four states).

121. See id. at 42, 44 (discussing roll call); Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States
Parties, Official Records on its Resumed 8th Sess., Mar. 22-25, 2010, Non-Paper by the
Chairman on Outstanding Issues Regarding the Conditionsfor the Exercise of Jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20/Add.1, Annex II, Appendix I (setting forth chart), available at
htp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP8
/OR/OR-ASPR8-ENG.ANNEXES.pdf.
Other commentators report slightly different tallies of this informal vote. See Trahan, supra
note 80, at 63; see also Barriga & Grover, supra note 98, at 6 n.14 (listing countries voting
in favor of and against a consent-based regime).
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Combining Boxes 3 and 4 revealed that a strong majority of States
Parties (fifty-five) favored no exclusive Security Council filter, although thirteen states disagreed. The fundamental debate was this:
Did states want a consent-based regime (Boxes 1 and 3), a system
controlled by the Security Council (Boxes 1 and 2) or a Court with
expansive jurisdiction over the crime (Box 4)? The negotiations in
Kampala became an effort to "think outside the box" in order to
bridge these disparate and seemingly intractable positions.122
C. The Foundationfor Negotiations in Kampala

On the eve of the Kampala Review Conference, the Chair of
the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression submitted a Conference Room Paper setting forth a proposed draft outcome for the Review Conference with "a view toward completing the remaining
work" on the crime of aggression. 123 The Paper was accompanied by
a new Non-Paper, this one discussing "Further Elements for a Solution on the Crime of Aggression." 124 The Conference Room Paper,
which did not endeavor to advance the negotiations from the close of
the final preparatory sessions, contained the necessary components
that, once finalized, would make the crime of aggression capable of
immediate operationalization: a definition of the crime and proposed
elements, a jurisdictional regime, an enabling resolution and interpretive understandings. 125
Although the Conference Room Paper contained the seeds of
a complete package, the text addressing the two main obstacles to
consensus remained in brackets and reflected all four boxes from the
straw poll. First, three broad filter options remained under consideration: an exclusive and determinative Security Council filter (Alternative 1); an exclusive but not determinative Security Council filter
(Alternative 2, Option 1); and a menu of alternative fallback filters
that would operate in the absence of Security Council action (Alter-

122. Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 884 (noting that delegations remained firm in their
positions on the eve of the Kampala Conference).
123.

See May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supra note 79.

124. Int'l Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, May 31 -June 11,
2010, Non-Paper by the Chair: Further Elements fbr a Solution on the Crime of
Aggression, U.N. Doc. RC/WGCA/2 (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs /asp-docs/RC2010 /RC-WGCA-2-ENG.pdf [hereinafter May 25, 2010 NonPaper].
125.

See May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supra note 79.
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native 2, Options 2-4).126 The candidate entities for exercising these
alternative filters remained the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (Option 2),
the UN General Assembly (Option 3) and the International Court of
Justice (Option 4). The Security Council filter appeared in two
forms: the first requiring an express determination of aggression (Article 15bis(3)) and the second espousing the "green light option" (Alternative 1, Option 2). This Conference Room Paper did not put forward a red light function for the Council. 127
The second bracketed issue within the Conference Room Paper concerned the entry into force mechanism for the aggression
amendments, reflecting the longstanding debate over the applicability
of Article 121(4) versus (5). In this regard, the Conference Room
Paper put forward the two competing interpretations of the second
sentence of Article 121(5) as interpretive "understandings" in an Annex. Under the first interpretation (Alternative 1, the so-called Posi126.

Proposed Article l5bis read as follows:
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with article 13, subject to the provisions of this article.
2. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first
ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of
aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court,
including any relevant information and documents.
3. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor
may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.
4. (Alternative 1) In the absence of such a determination, the Prosecutor may
not proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression,
Option I - end the paragraph here.
Option 2 - add: unless the Security Council has, in a resolution adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requested the
Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of
aggression.
4. (Alternative 2) Where no such determination is made within [6] months
after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation
in respect of a crime of aggression,
Option 1 - end the paragraph here.
Option 2 - add: provided that the Pre-Trial Chamber has authorized the
commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression
in accordance with the procedure contained in article 15;
Option 3 - add: provided that the General Assembly has determined that
an act of aggression has been committed by the State referred to in
article 8 bis;
Option 4 - add: provided that the International Court of Justice has
determined that an act of aggression has been committed by the State
referred to in article 8 bis.
Id. at 4-5.
127.

Id.
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tive Understanding), jurisdiction would exist over acts of aggression
committed against a State Party that had accepted the aggression
amendments (regardless of whether the aggressor state(s) was a party
or had accepted the amendments). Under the second interpretation
(Alternative 2, the so-called Negative Understanding), jurisdiction
would not exist over acts of aggression committed by any state that
had not accepted the amendments, whether party or non-party.128
The Chair's formulation of the Negative Understanding in the Conference Room Paper thus covered both States Parties and Non-Party
States, even though the application to the latter was not obvious from
the plain text of Article 121(5). As noted, 129 this adaptation reflected
the generally accepted view that Non-Party States should not be
worse off vis-d-vis the aggression amendments than States Parties
that declined to ratify the new provisions.
Other understandings in the Annex of the Conference Room
Paper flagged a few additional open issues. One was the question of
when the Security Council could start referring cases, with the options being, first, upon adoption of the amendments or second, upon
entry into force of the amendments. 130 The latter depended on the
choice between Article 121(4) and (5); entry into force under the
former would have a longer time horizon by requiring seven-eighths
ratification, whereas under the latter, the provisions could become
operational vis-A-vis the Council upon a single ratification plus one
year. The Non-Paper suggested that notwithstanding the provisions'
rapid entry into force under Article 121(5), the court's ability to assert jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could be further delayed
for a period of years. 131 Proposed understandings on temporal jurisdiction only gave the court jurisdiction over acts of aggression committed after either the adoption of the amendments or their entry into
force, in the alternative. 132 These understandings did little to clarify
when an act of aggression is deemed to have been committed1 33 or
whether an act of aggression that leads to a full-blown armed conflict
might be considered a continuing crime.134 The Conference Room

128.

Id. at 7.

129.

See supra text accompanying note 88.

130.

May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supranote 79, at 7.

131.

May 25, 2010 Non-Paper, supra note 124, at 1.

132.

May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supranote 79, at 7.

133. Id. at 3 (where Article 8bis(1) includes the planning and preparation of an act of
aggression as a punishable actus reus of the crime).
134.

In the final package, Understanding 3 states that:
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Paper also suggested a potential review clause that would allow for
the subsequent reconsideration of the jurisdictional regime,1 35 ostensibly included in order to "accommodate the concerns of delegations
that have shown flexibility in their position." 136
D. The Arc of the Kampala Negotiations

The May 25, 2010 Papers served as the basis for the first plenary session of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression of
the Kampala Review Conference.1 37 The general debate was held on
Friday, June 4, 2010. Early at this session, Brazil orally introduced
its own proposal, apparently the subject of consultations during the
weeks leading up to Kampala. It was endorsed by Argentina and
Switzerland, thus earning the moniker the "ABS Proposal." 138 According to the Brazilian delegate, the ABS Proposal identified two
elements from all four boxes of the straw poll that received widespread and possibly consensual support: first, the definition of the
crime; and second, the power of the Security Council to refer situations involving acts of aggression for prosecution. These provisions,
it was argued, should enter into force immediately pursuant to Article
121(5), thus responding to the preferences of states in Boxes 1 and 2.
The ABS group proposed inserting these provisions into Article 5 of
the ICC Statute, signaling an intent to be consistent with Article
121(5), which governs amendments to that article.
Brazil recognized that other aspects of the aggression package, particularly referrals by States Parties and proprio motu investigations, were more controversial and thus might be subject to differIt is understood that in case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed
after a decision in accordance with article 15 bis, paragraph 3, is taken, and one
year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States
Parties, whichever is later.
Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, at 22.
135.

May 25, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supranote 79, at 2 n.3.

136. May 25, 2010 Non-Paper, supra note 124, at 1. Notably, this proposed review
clause would have allowed a reconsideration of the jurisdictional regime only, as opposed to
the definition of the crime, which-while unbracketed still did not enjoy universal support.
137.

For another insider account, see Wenaweser, supra note 51.

138. Non-Paper Submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland as of June 6, 2010 (on
file with the author). Many of the texts circulated in Kampala are untitled, undated, and
unattributed. I have provided as much detail as possible to identify the particular text. See
Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 885 (describing ABS proposal); Kre8 & von Holtzendorff,
supra note 63, at 1202-03 (also describing the ABS proposal).
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ent treatment. Under the ABS Proposal, these other aggression triggers would become operational at a later stage-after seven-eighths
ratification pursuant to Article 121(4)-and be subject to an internal
filter by the Pre-Trial Chamber in accordance with Boxes 3 and 4.
These other provisions were to be inserted in a new Article 15bis.
Brazil thus proposed that different parts of the aggression provisions
be subject to different amendment regimes.139 The theory was that
this sequential approach would allow time for the court to mature institutionally and gain experience with aggression prosecutions under
the supervision of the Security Council while ensuring that the more
controversial trigger mechanisms became operational only after the
aggression amendments enjoyed a high level of state support as manifested by the seven-eighths ratification. The goal was thus to merge
aspects of all four Boxes into a single proposal that would over time
lead the court toward Box 4.
By the time of the June 4 plenary, most delegations had not
formulated a position on the ABS Proposal, or even seen a draft text
for that matter, and so despite expressing interest and gratitude for
Brazil's contribution to the debate, no strong support was given. Japan spoke forcefully against the ABS Proposal, however, saying that
any final package must be legally proper and not just politically expedient. The Japanese delegate argued that while flexibility was appropriate on issues of policy, there were limits where legal interpretations were at issue, especially in the penal context. He reminded
delegates that they were forging the aggression amendments within
the framework of a pre-existing penal regime and were not in a position to rewrite the treaty. The treaty, he argued, envisioned two mutually exclusive amendment regimes. Any amendments had to be
adopted according to the appropriate amendment clause-Article
121(5) and the Negative Understanding in his view-and not piecemeal pursuant to one or another clause as convenient, no matter how
laudable the intentions. In his estimation, the ABS Proposal was viable only if Article 121 were amended.140 Japan urged delegates to
139. See Coracini, supra note 42, at 758 (noting that the ABS Proposal remained
"faithful to the entry into force mechanisms foreseen in Article 121 (4) and (5).").
140. Echoing something suggested by Switzerland, Japan in its next intervention raised
the question of whether it would be possible to amend the amendment procedures pursuant
to Article 121(4) and then have the aggression amendments enter into force either
simultaneously or consecutively with those amendments. See KreB & von Holtzendorff,
supra note 63, at 1212 (describing Japanese intervention). Several weeks after the Review
Conference, Japan circulated a Non-Paper reiterating its concerns about the legality of the
amendment procedures and the need for legal clarity in the penal context. See Non-Paper on
the Crime of Aggression (on file with the author).
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produce a principled outcome in Kampala that could be justified to
both domestic and international audiences. To some applause, rare in
such settings, Japan closed with the caution that proceeding otherwise would risk undermining the credibility of both the ICC Statute
and the system of international criminal justice. Denmark and Belgium later associated themselves with the Japanese intervention.141
After a day's worth of interventions on the original Conference Room Paper and alternative proposals, the Chair released the
next Conference Room Paper late in the day on June 5, 2010.142 Re141. Several interventions later, Slovenia orally introduced an alternative but derivative
proposal that it explained was based on the calculation that the non-Security Council filters
would take too long to become fully operational under the ABS Proposal. The Slovenian
Proposal thus added a third, interim stage during which time the court could entertain State
Party and proprio motu referrals involving States Parties that had accepted the aggression
amendments. Thus, in phase one, Security Council referrals could proceed against the
nationals of any state. Once a certain number of states had ratified the amendments (the
number thirty was suggested), aggression prosecutions could go forward according to the
two other trigger mechanisms on the basis of reciprocity, so long as all the relevant states
(the victim and aggressor state(s)) had accepted the aggression amendments. Once seveneighths of all States Parties had ratified or accepted the aggression amendments, all trigger
mechanisms would become fully operational in phase three, and the aggression provisions
would apply equally to all Party and Non-Party States. Like the ABS Proposal, this package
envisioned an evolutionary process whereby the aggression regime would begin under the
control of the Security Council (a modified Box 2) but end with a form of universal
jurisdiction over the crime once a high number of States Parties had accepted the
amendments (Box 4). Both the ABS and Slovenian Proposals largely ignored the second
sentence of Article 121(5) and the debate over the Positive and Negative Understandings.
See Amendment on the Crime of Aggression-Adoption in Accordance with the Article 121
(on file with the author). Later, Slovenia disseminated a second Non-Paper, which built on
the ideas of consent and reciprocity already circulating among the delegations while
retaining a strong role for the Security Council as desired by the proponents of Boxes 1 and
2. See Non-Paper by Slovenia (June 8, 2010) (on file with the author). According to this
scheme, the court would exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression on the basis of a
Security Council referral immediately. Where "all State Parties concerned with the alleged
crime of aggression have deposited instruments of ratification or acceptance of the
amendment on the crime of aggression," the other triggers would be operational. Id. art.
15bis(4). In the event that not all concerned states had ratified the aggression amendments,
the Prosecutor would have to go back to the Security Council and "readdress the possibility
of the Security Council referral in accordance with Article 13(b) with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations." Id. art. 15bis(4bis). Neither Slovenian proposal received much
traction among delegations. See Trahan, supra note 80, at 72 (noting that the Slovenian
proposal "did not appear to significantly alter the mix.").
142. The Chair reissued this Paper on June 6, 2010 after fixing several errors. Int'l
Crim. Ct., Review Conference of the Rome Statute, May 31 -June 11, 2010, Conference
Room Paperon the Crime ofAggression (June 6, 2010), U.N. Doc. No. RC/WGCA/ I /Rev.1,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/RC2010/RC-WGCA-1-Rev .1-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter June 6, 2010 Conference Room Paper].
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fleeting the clear but at times reluctant preference of delegations, the
Paper eliminated all but two filter alternatives. The remaining contenders were-first, Alternative 1, an exclusive Security Council filter (with the green light option relegated to a footnote 43) and second,
Alternative 2, an internal judicial filter in the Pre-Trial Chamber,
with the option of requiring an en banc ruling 44 or an automatic appeals process.145 This was despite the fact that some States Parties
had spoken in favor of a General Assembly and International Court
of Justice filter (denominated Article 15bis(4)(Alternative 2)(Options
3 and 4)), and very few states outside of the P-5 had spoken in favor
of an exclusive Security Council filter. 146 This Paper also eliminated
the possibility of no filter at all (styled Alternative 2, Option 1 in the
prior Conference Room Paper). Absent a surge of negative feedback,
it was inevitable that the crime of aggression would be subject to
some filter, either the Security Council acting alone or subject to a
backup filter in the form of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
In the subsequent and last plenary session of the Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression held on June 7, 2010, delegations
expressed support for the Chair's changes. But the ABS Proposal also began to show some traction. In particular, delegations maintained that the two-tiered sequential approach of the ABS Proposal
respected the primary though not exclusive role for the Security
143.

Id. at 3.

144. In the deliberations, other procedural enhancements to the Pre-Trial Chamber filter
were discussed, such as a unanimity requirement and amendments to Article 36 that would
mandate the appointment ofjudges with expertise in public international law and require that
such judges be assigned to make aggression determinations. Although this was never
formally proposed, delegations might also have considered raising the operative burden of
proof before the Pre-Trial Chamber to parallel that required to issue an arrest warrant or
confimn an indictment. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(l)(a) (requiring proof that
"[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court" prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant); id. art. 61(5) (requiring
"the Prosecutor [to] support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged.").
145. June 6, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supra note 142, at 3. Guaranteeing a right
of appeal would ensure that seven judges-at least four from the Pre-Trial Chamber
(composed of a minimum of six judges) sitting en banc and three from the Appeals Chamber
(composed of five judges, including the President of the Court)--had determined that a state
had committed an act of aggression and approved the decision to go forward with an
aggression prosecution. There was little discussion about what would happen in the event of
a "tie" vote in the Pre-Trial Division. Presumably, the vote of the President of the Division
would be determinative.
146. See Coracini, supra note 42, at 757 (discussing gradual loss of support of
alternative external filters).
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Council in aggression prosecutions while ensuring the possibility of
supervised prosecutions that did not enjoy Security Council approval.
Advocates also argued that the long entry into force process would
provide comfort to those states concerned about relinquishing Security Council control over the crime of aggression. 147 Most of the disapproval of the ABS Proposal mirrored Japan's legalistic intervention, criticizing the Proposal's reliance upon alternative and mutually
incompatible amendment procedures for different components of the
aggression amendments. 148
On the evening of June 7, the Chair introduced a new Conference Room Paper. 149 Although the text did not refer to the ABS Proposal, the impact of these schemes on the new package was immediately clear. 150 In particular, the Chair's Paper shifted the attention
from filters to triggers, contemplated differential tracks for Security
Council- and non-Security Council-triggered prosecutions and envisioned sequential activation of different aspects of the aggression regime. 151 Thus, according to proposed Article l5bis of this Paper,
state referrals and proprio motu investigations would be subject to a
preliminary Security Council filter. Alternative 1, the exclusive Security Council filter, and Alternative 2, allowing for an enhanced PreTrial Chamber filter in the absence of Security Council action (either
an express determination or a green light to go forward), remained
bracketed.
A new proposed Article 15ter governed Security Council referrals, which were subjected to an exclusive Security Council filter.
At first glance, it seemed incongruous to imagine that the Council
would refer a situation and then exercise its filter power to prevent an
aggression prosecution from going forward. The idea was, however,
that the Council would refer situations, or crime bases, rather than
particular crimes or defendants. Once the Prosecutor determined that
aggression charges might be warranted, the Prosecutor would be
obliged to consult the Council to allow the filter function to work and
147. See id. at 760 (noting that delayed entry into force would give states time to
become familiar with the new provisions).
148. See David Scheffer, The Complex Crime ofAggression Under the Rome Statute, 23
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 897, 903 (2010) (arguing that the activation provisions were "radical[ly]"
tinkered with and probably merited an amendment to the amendment procedures).
149. Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression (June 7, 2010) (on file with
author) [hereinafter June 7, 2010 Conference Room Paper].
150. Barriga & Grover, supra note 98, at 7 ("For the chief negotiators, the ABS
proposal was extremely useful.").
151.

June 7, 2010 Conference Room Paper, supra note 149, at 4-5.
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launch a formal aggression investigation. If the Council determined
that an aggression prosecution was unwarranted for whatever reason,
it could block those charges from going forward by declining to
make an aggression determination. Other potential charges of war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide could proceed unless
the Council implemented a broader deferral under Article 16. In the
event of a Council determination of aggression, or alternatively a
green light Council resolution, the aggression charges could go forward alongside any other applicable charges. 152
On June 9, the ABS Proposal proponents and Canada 53 prepared a joint submission 54 that would have made the state party and
proprio motu referral powers operational five years after the entry into force of the aggression amendments for any state party. 55 Both
types of referrals would be subject to a preliminary Security Council
152. In terms of entry into force, the Chair's draft for the first and only time proposed
that the amendments to Article 15 might enter into force pursuant to Article 121(4) and the
seven-eighths rule. Id. at 1. He also suggested that all amendments could be activated for
the court immediately upon adoption but vis-A-vis States Parties one year after their
ratification or acceptance of the amendments. This would allow the court to receive Security
Council referrals of aggression immediately but would delay the ability of States Parties and
the Prosecutor to initiate aggression prosecutions until the requisite ratifications had
accumulated. Id. at I n.2. All the new provisions were potentially subject to a delayed entry
into force. Id. at 4 n.4, 5 n.7. The rest of the proposed package remained unchanged.
153. In earlier diplomatic meetings, Canada had floated a consent-based menu approach
to jurisdictional filters. See Draft Proposal of Canada (July 7, 2009) (on file with the
author); Kre8 & von Holtzendorff, supra note 63, at 1202-03 (describing proposal); see also
Coracini, supra note 42, at 758-59 (discussing and critiquing Canadian approach).
According to the original iteration of this model, upon ratification of the amendments, States
Parties could indicate which filter mechanism(s) they would accept. Once the Prosecutor
initiated an aggression investigation, the acceptable filter mechanism would operate on the
basis of reciprocity along the lines of the ICJ's optional clause. After the General Assembly
and International Court of Justice filter options disappeared from the Chair's Conference
Room Paper, Canada refined its proposal and circulated a text providing that in the absence
of a Security Council determination that a state had committed an act of aggression, the
Prosecutor could proceed with an investigation if the Pre-Trial Chamber granted
authorization, so long as all states concerned with the alleged act of aggression had accepted
this role for the Pre-Trial Chamber. See Refined Proposal of Canada art. 15bis (on file with
the author). Attempting to bridge the gap between Boxes 2 and 3, the proposal envisioned
that the court could immediately exercise jurisdiction over aggression cases with a Security
Council detenination and that the reciprocity regime would become operational once at
least two states had adopted the aggression amendments.
154. See Declaration (Draft of June, 9, 2010, 2010 16h00) (on file with the author); see
also Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 885 (describing joint proposal); Kre8 & von
Holtzendorff, supra note 63, at 1203-04 (also describing the joint proposal).
155.

Declaration (Draft of June 9, 2010, 16h00), supra note 154, art. 15bis(l).
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filter and then a fall-back Pre-Trial Chamber filter as set forth in Alternative 2 of the prior Conference Room Paper. Although it was not
spelled out, the joint text seemed to assume that Security Council referrals could commence immediately upon adoption of the aggression
amendments.
Signaling an enormous concession on the part of the ABS coalition, the joint submission adopted Canada's earlier consent- and
reciprocity-based approach, 156 and contained an opt-out provision for
States Parties similar to, but more robust than, Article 124 of the existing ICC Statute, which pertains to war crimes.' 57 This joint text
stated that the aggression provisions would be applicable to state party nationals and territory unless the party submitted an opt-out declaration prior to December 15, 2015 to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. (Any state that ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute after that date would have to file the declaration of nonacceptance on the date of ratification or accession). The opt-out declaration could be withdrawn at any time.158 In another concession,
this joint text stated that in "respect of a State which is not a party to
156. See supra note 153; see also Trahan, supra note 80, at 73 n.97 (noting that the opt
out was meant to bridge the gap between states supporting the ABS Proposal and the earlier
Canadian proposal). As Barriga and Grover note, "[t]he chief negotiators could not ignore
this significant agreement struck between delegations representing fundamentally opposed
positions on the question of aggressor State consent, who were willing to actively promote
their compromise among other delegations." Barriga & Glover, supra note 98, at 8.
157. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 124 ("Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1
and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven
years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration
under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this article shall be
reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1.").
158. Declaration (Draft of June 9, 2010, 16h00), supra note 154, art. 15bis(4bis-4ter).
If withdrawn, it was not clear if the opt-out declaration could be re-lodged either indefinitely
or at least prior to December 15, 2015. Japan subsequently built on this proposal with an
opt-out scheme of its own that envisioned that upon the ratification of the aggression
amendments by seven eighths of States Parties that have not filed the opt-out declaration, the
Assembly would convene another Review Conference to consider whether the provisions
should enter into force for all States pursuant to the conditions for jurisdiction set out in
Article 12 and applicable to the other three crimes. This proposal stated unambiguously that
"[t]he court may not exercise jurisdiction with respect to a crime of aggression committed by
a non-State Party." This latter phrase probably should have read "act of aggression" given
the distinction made in Article 8bis between acts of aggression, which are committed by
states, and crimes of aggression, which are committed by individuals. This proposal was not
well circulated or extensively discussed. See Japanese Proposal, The Following Is Inserted
after Article 15 of the Statute (on file with the author).
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this Statute, this Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression as provided for in this article when committed by
that State's nationals or on its territory." 159 Although this passage
seemed designed to exclude Non-Party States altogether from the aggression provisions, the draft text contained language identical to the
second sentence of Article 121(5), thus reproducing the ambiguity
over the Negative and Positive Understanding of that article. In explanation, proponents insisted that the object of this text was in fact
to exempt Non-Party States. That said, the entire package, and particularly the opt-out declaration, was premised on an entry into force
pursuant to the Positive Understanding of Article 121(5), thus suggesting that the same language in different parts of the Statute would
have entirely different meanings, contrary to standard interpretative
principles. 160 This joint text marked the convergence of the two primary positions opposed to Security Council control over aggression
prosecutions-the ABS group, which favored a broad jurisdictional
regime, and the more moderate group of states led by Canada, which
favored non-political and consent-based limits on the court's jurisdiction.
Once the Working Group completed its work and adopted its
Report,161 the President of the Assembly of States Parties, Christian
Wenaweser, made his first public foray into the aggression deliberations mid-day on June 10, with a Non-Paper in the form of a draft
resolution on the crime of aggression that was based on informal
consultations with states. 162 This was the first of three Non-Papers in
which the President attempted to bring the negotiations to a close.
From this point onward, negotiations proceeded in informal settings
rather than plenaries, so there is little formal record of states' views
on these texts. Like the Chair's final Conference Room Paper, the
President's first Non-Paper also adopted the two-tiered formula of
the ABS Proposal by bifurcating the amendments into Article 15bis,
governing non-Security Council-triggered investigations, and Article
15ter, governing Security Council-triggered investigations. For state
referrals and proprio motu investigations, the choice was still be-

159.

See Japanese Proposal, supra note 158.

160. See generally AUST, supra note 71, at 235, 244 (noting that terms in a treaty are to
be given their ordinary meaning unless the parties intended some special meaning).
161. Draft Report of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
RC/WGCA/3 (June 6, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/RC2010
/RC-WGCA-3-ENG.pdf.
162. Non-Paper by the President of the Assembly, Draft Resolution:
Aggression, June 10, 2010, 12h00 (on file with author).
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tween an exclusive Security Council filter (Alternative 1) and a filter
that, in the absence of Security Council action, reverted to the PreTrial Chamber (Alternative 2). The provisions for a Security Council
filter in Article 15ter governing Council referrals were bracketed for
the first time.
With respect to potential Security Council referrals, the public
record does not disclose which state proposed the idea of collapsing
the trigger and filter in Article 15ter, and no participating state spoke
in favor of it publicly. This formula seemed positioned as a concession to those states opposed to a strong role for the Security Council
in aggression prosecutions because it eliminated one mechanism of
Council control over the process.163 It was not clear, however, if it
was perceived as a concession or if it generated any counter concessions or change in position from the ABS group. The effect of eliminating the Article 15ter filter was that in the case of a situation referred to the court by the Security Council, the Prosecutor could
investigate potential charges of aggression without any further Security Council involvement (other than a potential Article 16 deferral). 164 Had the filter remained in Article 15ter, the Prosecutor would
need to have determined whether the Council had made the necessary
aggression determination if he or she wanted to pursue aggression
charges vis-A-vis a situation referred by the Council. There was some
concern that a filter-less Article 15ter would serve as a disincentive
to the Council to refer situations involving potential aggression
charges to the court because it could not easily control which charges
the Prosecutor would ultimately seek to bring. This was weakly addressed in footnote 8 of the Non-Paper, which stated, "this article
should not negatively affect the ability of the Security Council to exercise its competence under Article 13(b)." 65
As a part of the President's Non-Paper, Article l5bis was subject to a bracketed opt-out optionl 66 and a bracketed exclusion of jurisdiction over the nationals of Non-Party States,167 both elements
163. See Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 886 (describing Article 15ter as "streamlined"
and a "simplification of the procedure for investigations based on a Security Council referral
... which would eliminate the previously implied need for the Prosecutor to go back to the
Security Council for a determination of an act of aggression.").
164. David Scheffer argues that any situation referred to the court by the Security
Council and involving acts of aggression should be automatically deemed to meet any
gravity threshold. See Scheffer, supra note 148, at 899.
165.

Non-Paper by the President of the Assembly, supra note 162, at 3 n.8.

166.

Id. art. 15bis(lbis).

167. Id. art. l5bis(lter) ("The Court may not exercise jurisdiction with respect to an act
of aggression committed by a Non-State Party."). This formulation did not mirror the joint
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borrowed from the ABS/Canada joint text. The Non-Paper envisioned amendments entering into force pursuant to Article 121(5),
but no longer included any proposed understandings on how the second sentence of that provision should be interpreted. So, it was conspicuously silent on whether the Positive or Negative Understanding
was operative.168 The logic of the opt-out declaration, however, at
least suggested that the Non-Paper was based on the Positive Understanding. In other words, the court could exercise jurisdiction over
the nationals of States Parties that had not ratified or accepted the aggression amendments so long as the putative victim state(s) had ratified or accepted. 169 To avoid this, the putative aggressor state would
have to avail itself of the opt-out provision.
In the waning hours of June 10, the President issued his second Non-Paper. 170 According to this Non-Paper, neither trigger
mechanism would be operative until five years after the adoption of
the amendments and one year after the ratification or acceptance of
the amendments by thirty States Parties-a number that would signal
proposal completely; under this wording, the court could still exercise jurisdiction over acts
of aggression committed on the territory of Non-State Parties.
168. This Non-Paper for the first time referred to Article 12(1) in addition to Articles
5(2) in the preamble to the draft enabling resolution text, suggesting that States Parties had
already pre-consented to the court exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and
thus justifying the opt-out option and exclusion of express Non-Party States from the
amendments. Id. pmbl.
169. The Non-Paper also resolved some smaller open issues. With regard to the court's
temporal jurisdiction over crimes of aggression, it provided that crimes of aggression
committed after the aggression provisions had entered into force (rather than after they had
been adopted) would be within the court's ratione temporis. The Non-Paper also stated that
the Security Council would be able to commence referrals once the amendments entered into
force. In an Annex, the Non-Paper included some new understandings on the definition of
the crime of aggression and on the operation of the principle of complementarityunderstandings that had been considered in a parallel set of negotiations driven largely by
the United States.

See Beth Van Schaack, UnderstandingAggression II, INTLAWGRRLS

(June 26, 2010), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/06/understanding-aggression-ii.html;
Beth Van

Schaack,

Understanding Aggression I, INTLAwGRRLS

(June 24,

2010),

http:/intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/06/understanding-aggression.html. Later that day, the
President released a draft text setting forth an opt out that would have expired seven years
after adoption unless the State Party re-affirmed it. Although some members of the ABS
group had called for any opt out to be subject to a sunset clause, the expiring opt out
apparently received insufficient support and did not appear in any subsequent consolidated
text. The President also circulated another text that would have delayed the amendments'
entry into force for seven years, a period of time that paralleled the time period established
for the first Review Conference. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 123.
170. Second Non-Paper by the President of the Assembly, Draft Resolution: The Crime
of Aggression, June 10, 2010, 23h00 [hereinafter ASP President Second Non-Paper].
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at least some state support for the amendments. 171 Article 15ter, addressing Security Council-triggered prosecutions, contained no filter
mechanism, as had been anticipated from the prior Non-Paper. Article 15bis, concerning non-Council-triggered situations, was now expressly inapplicable to Non-Party States whether they be aggressors
or aggressed against. 172 Alternative 1 (exclusive Security Council filter) and a slightly modified Alternative 2 (which involved a Pre-Trial
Division (en banc) rather than a Pre-Trial Chamber back-up filter)
remained in play with respect to Article 15bis. Both had bracketed
text additions. The "green light" option also appeared in bracketed
text in connection with Alternative 1 as another way for the Security
Council to allow an aggression prosecution to go forward. Alternative 2 was subject to new bracketed text suggesting that the Security
Council could still block a prosecution through the exercise of a red
light function separate from and more robust than the Council's deferral powers under Article 16.173
The second Non-Paper also contained a slightly less robust
opt-out option than the first iteration: it required States Parties to at
least "consider" their opt-out declaration every three years, although
there was no expiration provision. 174 The second Non-Paper's final
difference included a review clause mandating an evaluation of all
the amendments on the crime of aggression seven years after the be-

171.

Id. arts. 15bis(lbis), 15ter(2).

172. Id. art. 15bis(I quater) ("In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that
State's nationals or on its territory.") This opt-out formulation also designated the Registrar,
rather than the UN Secretary General, as the recipient of any declarations lodged. The latter
is the recipient of declarations filed under Article 124. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art.
124. This has given rise to concerns that declarations opting out of the aggression
amendments may not be made public. See Coracini, supra note 42, at 761, 779.
173.

The text read:
Where no such determination [by the Council] is made ... the Prosecutor may
proceed with the investigation . . . provided that the Pre-Trial Division has
authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of
aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, [and the
Security Council does not decide otherwise.]
ASP President Second Non-Paper, supra note 170, art. 15bis(4) (Alternative 2) (second set
of brackets in original).
174. Id. at 15bis(Iter) ("The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise
jurisdiction over a crime of aggression arising from an act of aggression committed by a
State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such
jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The withdrawal of such a
declaration may be affected at any time and shall be considered by the State Party within
three years.").
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ginning of the court's exercise of jurisdiction, 175 which signaled that
detractors might get a chance to revisit the crime's definition as well
as other elements of the amendments. In practical terms, any review
conference would have convened no earlier than twelve years, when
the seven-year lag was combined with the delayed activation of the
amendments, which was slated to take at least five years. Given the
increasingly cumbersome procedure set forth in Article 15bis, the
Non-Paper prompted renewed calls by some members of the P-5 to
eliminate Article 15bis altogether and launch only Article 15ter, with
the understanding that delegates would continue work on Article
15bis. There were other calls as well to finalize the definition only.1 76 In terms of activation of the amendments, Article 121(5) remained operative. 177
After a day of informal negotiations and other Review Conference business, the President released a third and final Non-Paper
on the afternoon of June 11. This Non-Paper contained almost all of
the elements that would become the final package. On several fronts,
this third Non-Paper further diminished the role of the Security
Council in Article 15bis situations. First, the third Non-Paper revealed a major, controversial but not totally unsurprising development: the elimination from Article 15bis of Alternative 1, which embodied the idea of an exclusive Security Council filter.'78 Instead,
prosecutions initiated through state referrals or proprio motu action
would be subject to a Pre-Trial Division filter involving all of the
Pre-Trial Chamber judges in the event that the Security Council had
not already made an affirmative aggression determination. 179 The
175.

Id. art. 3bis.

176. On the morning of June 11, the African Group issued an unenthusiastic response to
the Second Non-Paper. In essence, the African Group viewed this Non-Paper as a step back
and argued that the opt out should be subject to expiration, that no subsequent review
conference should be mandated, that the delayed entry into force should be eliminated for
Article 15bis at least, and that Alternative I allowing a Security Council filter should be
excised. The African Group did, however, accept the language of draft Article Iquater,
which was significant because the provision exempted Non-Party States from the aggression
provisions altogether. African Group's Response to the Non-Paper by the President of the
Assembly of the 10th June 2010 (on file with the author).
177. ASP President Second Non-Paper, supra note 170, at opening para.1. This NonPaper also added a reference to Article 5(2), which states that any definition of aggression
and jurisdictional regime is to be consistent with the UN Charter. See supra note 3.
178. Third Non-Paper by the President of the Review Conference, June 11, 2010, 16h30
(on file with author).
179. It has been noted that requiring this en banc detennination "complements the
substantive requirement that the state act of aggression must constitute a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations." Blokker & Krep, supra note 35, at 893-94.
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"green light" option for the Security Council also disappeared, mandating an express aggression determination by the Council. In addition, the lack of any red light option ensured that the Council could
block a prosecution only through the exercise of its Article 16 powers, which allows for a renewable deferral rather than a complete
termination of a case. 180 The temporary nature of an Article 16 deferral renders it a weaker control mechanism than the red light option, which had appeared in brackets in the prior Non-Paper, although
both would be subject to the Council veto.
In other developments, the opt-out option remained, as did the
exclusion of Non-Party States.' 8 ' None of the provisions would be in
force until at least one year after thirty States Parties had ratified or
accepted the aggression amendments-a more uncertain date than
envisioned by some prior proposals. 182 Seven years after the court
had begun to exercise jurisdiction over the crime, the Assembly of
States Parties would review all the amendments-definitional and jurisdictional-on the crime of aggression. 183 Finally, and crucially,
the third Non-Paper contained placeholders for activating Articles
15bis and 15ter, signaling the last open issue of the Review Conference. Like previous Non-Papers, this version recalled Article 12(1)
of the ICC Statute, 184 which sets forth the jurisdictional preconditions
for the existing crimes within the court's jurisdiction, noted that the
amendments would be adopted in accordance with Article 5(2) and
identified that the amendments would enter into force in accordance
with Article 121(5).185

With most of the elements of a final package in place, attention now turned to reaching the optimum balance of automaticity and
conditionality for operationalizing Articles 15bis and 15ter. In the
somewhat frenzied informal negotiations that ensued, proponents of a
rapid implementation of the prohibition on the crime of aggression
sought to lock in the text achieved and to ensure its automatic, if delayed, operationalization. In contrast, other states sought to keep
open the possibility of reconsidering at a later date both the text of
the amendments and the very operationalization of the crime.

180.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16.

181.

Third Non-Paper by the President of the Review Conference, supranote 178, at 3.

182.

Id. at 3-4.

183.

Id. at 1.

184.

Id. at pmbl, para. 1.

185.

Id. at opening para. 1.
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One proposal from the Chair, for example, would have delayed entry into force for both Articles 15bis and 15ter until at least
2017.186 After that date, Article 15bis would have become operational only once States Parties so decided. In contrast, Article 15ter was
subject to a flipped presumption such that it would have become operational in that year, unless States Parties decided otherwise.18 7 This
text thus contemplated the possibility of an exclusive Security Council trigger in the event that the Assembly of States Parties could not
agree to activate Article 15bis. Another solution from a participant
provided that Article 15bis would only enter into force following a
consensus decision of States Parties or the entry into force of an
amendment to that effect. 188 Either action had to be taken at a Review Conference to be held no earlier than seven years after the
adoption of the amendments on the crime of aggression. This
scheme suggested that the States Parties could also consider "any related amendments proposed for the Statute with the aim of strengthening the Court," 189 which was likely code for reconsidering Article
8bis as well. Other ideas swirling around for resolving the conditionality/automaticity conundrum included holding off on operationalization but mandating that a Review Conference be convened "with a
view toward" adopting the amendments and exploring alternative
voting procedures or thresholds, such as a simple majority with some
geographic proportionality.
At the literal eleventh hour on the final day of the Conference,
the President released a text containing the entry into force provisions
that were missing from the final Non-Paper. 190 According to the final
provisions, which are identical, both Articles 15bis and 15ter are subject to activation no earlier than January 1, 2017, following a "decision to be taken . . . by the same majority of States Parties as is re-

quired for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute." Even then,
the amendments adopted will not be operational until a year after
thirty states have ratified or accepted them. 191 In a nod to opponents
186.

Proposal on file with the author.

187. See Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 886 (describing this proposal). As discussed
infra, the final text eliminated this presumption and subjected all trigger mechanisms to an
affirmative vote of the ASP.
188.

Proposal on file with the author.

189.

Id.

190. New PP 6: Resolved to activate the court's jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression as early as possible, June 11, 2010, 23h00 (on file with author).
191. Presumably, even states that exercise their opt-out rights will be counted toward
this threshold. Scheffer, supra note 148, at 903 n.4.
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of the crime, the President erred on the side of conditionality, essentially pushing off to another day the decision to operationalize all aspects of the amendments. The enabling resolution calls on states to
ratify the amendments. As a practical matter, however, some states
may find it politically difficult to ratify or formally accept the
amendments until after States Parties have decided in 2017 on
whether to implement both Articles 15bis and 15ter. That said, there
is nothing within the final resolution that prevents States Parties from
ratifying or accepting the amendments in their current, uncertain and
partial form. Accordingly, depending on how long it takes for thirty
States Parties to ratify the amendments, it may be a decade or more
before the court has the capacity to actually prosecute aggression.
Because it appears that States Parties must decide whether to
activate both Articles 15bis and 15ter, the Assembly of States Parties
could conceivably implement a sequential activation of Security
Council and non-Security Council referrals in 2017. According to
the final text, this decision need not be taken at a formal Review
Conference. 192 Some no doubt will argue that there is no need to
convene an entire Review Conference to consider the operationalization of text that has already been the subject of intensive negotiations.
In any case, the text suggests that this decision to operationalize Articles l5bis and/or 15ter is to be taken by the "same majority of States
Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute"-a reference to Article 121(3), which urges adoption of amendments by consensus but allows for a two-thirds majority to prevail
where consensus cannot be reached.193
E. The ProvisionsAdopted

Assuming the aggression amendments become operational, a
prosecution can only go forward a year after the necessary States Parties have accepted or ratified the aggression amendments pursuant to
Article 121(5) in the absence of a Security Council referral. With the
disappearance of the draft understandings on the interpretation of Article 121(5), the final resolution is concertedly ambiguous as to
whether the Negative or Positive Understanding of Article 121(5)
192. Article 123(2) provides that the Secretary General, upon the request of a State
Party and the approval of a majority of the States Parties, can convene subsequent Review
Conferences.
193. That Article reads: "the adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly
of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall
require a two-thirds majority of States Parties."
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applies. 194 Thus it is the court that will ultimately decide whether the
ratification or acceptance of the aggression amendments by the putative aggressor state(s), the victim state(s), or both, is a precondition
for jurisdiction-or even whether Article 121(5) is the appropriate
amendment provision at all. In its decision, it will no doubt be guided by Article 22(2) which sets forth the principle of lenity.195 This
threshold determination will likely consume considerable pre-trial resources in the inaugural aggression case. In any case, no prosecution
will go forward if the aggressor state is a state party that has availed
itself of the opt-out option or if the potential defendant is a national
of a non-state party.
With either a state party' 96 orpropriomotu referral,' 97 the Security Council will operate as a preliminary filter mechanism. Six
months after ascertaining inaction by the Council, the Prosecutor will
go to the Pre-Trial Division and will have to convince four judges to
allow the aggression investigation to proceed. 198 The Pre-Trial Divi194.

See Burns Weston, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court:

Ambiguity's

Consensus, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 384 (1997) (discussing concept of

ambiguity's consensus in treaty drafting).
195. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 22(2) ("The definition of a crime shall be strictly
construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.").
196. In the event of a state referral, the prosecutor can also decline to initiate an
investigation for the reasons set forth in Article 53 of the ICC Statute, including that the
particular prosecution is against the "interests of justice." Id. art. 53.
197. As the Statute now stands, if the prosecutor initiates the investigation proprio motu,
he will first need to prove to the Pre-Trial Chamber that there is "a reasonable basis to
proceed" with the investigation at all, even prior to determining whether aggression charges
might be warranted. Id. art. 15. If the prosecutor decides to bring aggression charges, she or
he will need to pass through the two filters-the Security Council and Pre-Trial Division.
Id. The latter filter also operates according to Article 15 but involves the Pre-Trial Division
rather than just a Pre-Trial Chamber. Id. It is unclear from the final text whether these two
pre-trial forays could be collapsed into one. Id. Theoretically, the prosecutor may need to
get authority to proceed from a Chamber first and then go back to the entire Division if he
opts to pursue aggression charges. Id. That said, the text suggests that prior to seeking the
authority to proceed at all, the Prosecutor could first confirm inaction on the part of the
Security Council and then-six months later-seek both the general approval to proceed as
well as to bring aggression charges. Id.
198. Id. Article 15 does not give any participatory rights to states. During the
preliminary investigation phase, prior to when the Prosecutor goes before the Pre-Trial
Chamber for approval to proceed, Article 15(2) invites the Prosecutor to seek additional
information and written or oral testimony from states, UN organs, non-governmental
organizations and other reliable sources to determine the "seriousness" of the information
received. Once the Prosecutor goes before the Chamber, however, only victims are entitled
to make representations according to Article 15(3). Indeed, states have few participatory
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sion will no doubt take judicial notice of, and accord significant evidentiary weight to, the fact that the Security Council declined to either refer the situation itself or to make the necessary aggression determination.199 Presumably, this preliminary finding of the comcommission of an act of aggression will be subject to an interlocutory
appeal. The appeal can take the form of either a decision on jurisdiction pursuant to Article 82(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, or a "decision
that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and
for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance
the proceedings" pursuant to Article 82(1)(d). 200 The Security Council can refer situations involving aggression but need not make an
express aggression determination while doing so. 20 1 At any point, the
rights in the ICC Statute outside of the context of asserting the privilege of complementarity
pursuant to Articles 18 and 19 and contesting the existence of preconditions to jurisdiction
under Article 12. This is perhaps understandable given that with respect to the original
crimes, the court exercises jurisdiction over individuals and not States. Because the Article
15 process launches the formal investigation, it normally occurs prior to the identification of
particular defendants. As a result, no provision allows an accused to participate in this
process either. Thus, absent some amendment to the ICC Statute (which would likely be an
amendment "of an institutional nature" governed by Article 122) or procedural rule to
govern the aggression context, neither states nor defendants are entitled to raise arguments
on behalf of the supposed aggressor state at the time that the Pre-Trial Division is to make
the aggression determination.
199. Id. art. 15(3). In terms of the applicable burden of proof under Article 15, the
Prosecutor must demonstrate a "reasonable basis to proceed" with a proprio motu
investigation according to Rome Statute Article 15(4). Id. art. 15(4). At the moment, this
burden of proof appears to apply at the time of the Pre-Trial Division's aggression finding as
well. States did not contemplate altering this burden, although they might have.
200. It is not clear which person or entity would have standing to invoke such an appeal
in the event that the Pre-Trial Chamber allowed a formal aggression investigation to
proceed. At this preliminary stage, it is unlikely that an individual defendant will have been
publicly identified or have made an appearance before the court. States are not given any
rights to appeal under the Statute except within Article 57(d)(3) following a decision by the
Pre-Trial Chamber to allow for in situ investigations in non-cooperating states. Allowing
implicated states the right to appeal the aggression determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber
would have required amendment to Article 82. Id. art. 88. Questions about how to
implement the procedures governing the aggression determination may be able to be dealt
with through amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which are adopted by a
two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties. Id. art. 51(1). In the absence of a
relevant rule, the judges can devise an interim rule subject to the principle of lenity. Id. arts.
51(3) and (4).
201. See Blokker & KreB, supra note 35, at 893 (opining that enabling the Council to
make a referral without making an aggression determination will provide greater flexibility
for the Council).
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Security Council can exercise its Article 16 powers and defer the
prosecution for a year, on a renewable basis, so long as it can garner
the necessary majority and avoid a veto. 202 In light of the circuitous
and cumbersome jurisdictional regime created by the new amendments combined with the existing jurisdictional obstacles in the ICC
Statute, aggression prosecutions will likely be few and far between.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE

Each element of the negotiations and final compromise package implicates basic concepts of public international law: the supremacy of the Security Council in the face of breaches of the peace,
judicial independence and the principle of state consent. The
amendments are ultimately a triumph of voluntarism, which underlies
both the opt-out provision and the exclusion of Non-Party States.
With respect to consenting States Parties, the amendments largely
promote the judicial independence of the ICC, subject only to the extant Security Council deferral power. Although members of the P-5
had hoped to expand the Security Council's power over ICC prosecutions in the aggression context, this was not achieved. If anything,
the amendments signal a subtle erosion of Security Council power. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the Council will use Article
13(b) referral and the Article 16 deferral powers to control the ability
of the court to prosecute the crime of aggression. 203

202. Assuming the filter allows the investigation into crimes of aggression to go forward
and the Council does not defer, normal pre-trial obstacles come into play. If the Prosecutor
subsequently seeks a warrant for the arrest of a suspect, he or she will need to demonstrate
that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the person" committed the crime of
aggression. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(1)(a). The charges will then have to be
confirmed, requiring "sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed the crime charged." Id. art. 61(5). Only once these hurdles are crossed,
can the prosecution go forward. Conviction of the crime of aggression will require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that a State Party committed an act of aggression and the
defendant committed the crime of aggression. Id. art. 66.
203. The question of what limits, if any, are placed on the Security Council when it is
operating within its sphere of competency is not new. See Judith G. Gardam, Legal
Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 285, 287

(1996) (exploring to what extent the ius ad bellum and ius in bello apply to Council
enforcement actions under Chapter VII). To the extent that such limits exist, their
justiciability remains equally unresolved. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 11 13-40 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (considering to what extent the ICTY could exercise
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A. JudicialIndependence Versus Security Council Supremacy in
InternationalPeace and Security
Because the definition of aggression seemed destined to remain indeterminately expansive, the question of filters took on great
importance. The debate came down to which entity-political or judicial, internal or external-would be empowered to determine
whether a particular act of state constituted a "manifest" violation of
the UN Charter. This, in turn, presented the question of whether the
court would have some measure of autonomy from the Security
Council vis-d-vis the crime of aggression in the event of Council inaction. At one end of the spectrum was an exclusive and determinative Security Council filter; at the other end was no filter whatsoever,
which would allow state referrals and prosecutor-initiated cases to go
forward unsupervised except insofar as they are subject to Article 16.
Positioned between these polarities were alternative filters that could
operate in lieu of a Council filter or in tandem with it in the event the
Security Council declined, or failed, to make the necessary aggression determination. Of all the filter alternatives under consideration,
only the Pre-Trial Chamber was both politically palatable to the majority of States Parties and logistically feasible. The other alternatives remained controversial and presented problems of implementation that prevented their serious consideration as points of potential
compromise. 204
1. The Security Council Filter
There was no question that the Security Council could function as an aggression filter. Thus, debates centered on whether fealty
to the UN Charter demanded, or in any case counseled, that the
Council be given such a gate-keeping role, especially in light of the
fact that it already possessed a controversial control mechanism in
the form of its Article 16 deferral power. 205 The interventions of the
judicial review over the decision of the Security Council that created the tribunal in response
to the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia).
204. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan. 29-Feb.
1, 2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime ofAggression,
35-41, U.N.
Doc. ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex II (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35_English.pdf (discussing alternative filters as potential
compromises).
205. That the P-5's veto operated differently when the Council was acting as a filter
versus when it is activating its Article 16 power no doubt led to the unpopularity of the
former. Specifically, with respect to Article 16, the operation of the veto allows a
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P-5-particularly Russia, China and France-identified Security
Council primacy and exclusivity in aggression prosecutions as both a
legal imperative and a point of principle. 206
It was not always perceived as such by other states involved
in the negotiations, however. The P-5's legal arguments were Charter-based and turned on, inter alia, the Charter language in Article
12(1), which states that while the Council is engaged with a situation,
the General Assembly must refrain from making recommendations
regarding the dispute; 207 Article 24(1), which confers "primary" responsibility on the Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security; 208 and Article 39, which empowers the Council to determine threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.209 Given this textual mandate, the P-5 argued that no act of aggression could be considered a "manifest" violation of the Charter
absent a Council determination to this effect. They also argued that
reserving an exclusive role for the Council was consistent with the
text, logic and intent of General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974),
which served as the backbone for the definition of the crime of aggression. 210
Despite these arguments, the Security Council exclusivity
thesis came under fire for being without a firm basis in the text of the
UN Charter and inconsistent with UN practice. To be sure, the Charprosecution to go forward, whereas with respect to the filter, exercise of the veto would
block an aggression determination and thus a prosecution. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16.
206.

See supra text accompanying note 32.

207. U.N. Charter art. 12, para. I ("While the Security Council is exercising in respect
of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless
the Security Council so requests.").
208. Id. art. 24, para. I ("In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf").
209. Id. art. 39, para. I ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
210. This Resolution recognizes at a number of points the unique role of the Security
Council. In particular, Article 2 acknowledges that there may be situations when the
Council would decline to make an aggression finding notwithstanding a violation of Article
2(4) of the Charter or the Resolution itself. In addition, the Resolution reflects the fact that
the Council may deem certain uses of force to be legal or justified. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
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ter grants the Council an exclusive right to make an aggression determination for the purposes of enforcement measures governed by
Article 44. That said, the Charter envisions a role in this context for
other organs of the United Nations. For one, Article 24(1)'s assignment of "primary" responsibility to the Council implies that this
power is not exclusive. 211 Indeed, Article 1(1) lists the purposes of
the entire United Nations as follows:
To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace. 212
The General Assembly has, especially in situations in which
the Council did not act, invoked Charter recommendatory powers 213

211.

But see CRIME OF AGGRESSION:

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES 3 (Sept. 26,

2001), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16461.pdf (arguing that "primary"
refers to the fact that the maintenance of peace and security is the Council's most important
function, rather than that there exists some UN organ with concurrent power).
212.

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.

213. Id. art. 11, para. 1 (empowering the General Assembly to consider situations
involving international peace and security and make recommendations to states and the
Council); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/242, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/242 (Aug. 25, 1992) (concerning
acts by Serbia and Montenegro against Bosnia-Herzegovina); G.A. Res. 37/18, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/37/18 (Nov. 16, 1982) (concerning aggressive acts committed by Israel against Iraqi
nuclear installations); G.A. Res. 37/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/3 (Oct. 22, 1982) (considering
the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq conflict and reaffirming that no act of aggression should be
committed); G.A. Res. 36/226, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/226 (Dec. 17, 1981) (concerning
Israel's act of "aggression" in Lebanon); G.A. Res. 36/172, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/172 (Dec.
17, 1981) (concerning aggressive acts committed by South Africa in the region); G.A. Res.
36/27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/27 (Nov. 13, 1981); G.A. Res. 2795 (XXVI), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2795 (Dec. 10, 1971) (concerning acts committed by Portugal against Guinea-Bissau
and Cape Verde, but not employing the term "aggression"); G.A. Res. 2508 (XXIV), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2508 (Nov. 21, 1969); Question of South West Africa, G.A. Res. 1899 (XVIII),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1899 (Nov. 13, 1963) (considering "any attempt to annex a part or the
whole of the Territory of South West Africa [to constitute] an act of aggression"); see
generally UNITED

NATIONS,

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

OF

DEVELOPMENTS

AGGRESSION 242-51 (2003) (compiling resolutions).
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such as those embodied in its 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution 214 to
condemn state actions as aggression. 215 Presumably, the Assembly
could have continued this tradition had it been assigned a filter function.216 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also been asked

to rule on the legality of uses of force, conceivably opening the door
for the ICJ to serve this function in a filter capacity as well.217
When the P-5's legal arguments proved unconvincing, 218 policy arguments rose to the fore. The United Kingdom noted in an intervention that the ICC will be most effective when it is working in
tandem with-or at least not in opposition to-the Council, as the latter body seeks to maintain, or restore, international peace and security. 219 Given that the crime of aggression involves both state and individual action, the P-5 posited that an effective division of labor
between the Council and the court would reflect each entity's core
institutional competencies while protecting both the integrity of the
Charter system and the legitimacy of the court. 220 Indeed, the P-5 argued, externalizing the aggression determination to the Council
might actually insulate the court from charges of politicization. 221

214. G.A. Res. 377, U.N. Doc. A/RES/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950) (asserting that the
Assembly may make "appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force.").
215. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 498, U.N. Doc. A/RES/498(V) (Feb 1, 1951) (calling China's
actions in Korea "aggression"). Even the Security Council has invoked the Uniting for
Peace Resolution. See S.C. Res. 303, U.N. Doc. S/RES/303 (Dec. 6, 1971); S.C. Res. 157,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/157 (Sept. 17, 1960); S.C. Res. 129, U.N. Doc. S/RES/129 (Aug. 7, 1958);
S.C. Res. 120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/120 (Nov. 4, 1956)
216. Such a determination would be considered an "important decision" subject to a
two-thirds vote of those present and voting pursuant to Article 18(2) of the UN Charter.
U.N. Charter art. 18, para. 2.
217.

See infra text accompanying note 241.

218. Blokker & Krep, supra note 35, at 894 (arguing that the P-5's legal arguments for a
monopoly over the crime of aggression were unpersuasive).
219. See also Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan.
29 Feb. 1, 2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 23,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex II (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35_English.pdf (noting the view that "the Court
would benefit from the authority of the Security Council as there would be political backing
for the Court's investigation of situations.").
220. For summaries of these negotiating positions, see Report of the Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, Annex II, RC/20, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/asp-docs/RC2010 /RC-20-ENG-Annex.I1.WGCA.report.pdf.
221. Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007,
Informal Inter-SessionalMeeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
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The United States posited that States Parties should refrain from establishing a system that would either invite tensions, if not outright
conflict, between multiple United Nations bodies or that would generate potentially contradictory interpretations of aggression and sow
confusion within the international community. In particular, the
specter of a "constitutional crisis" within the United Nations was
raised if the ICC convicted a defendant of aggression in the absence
of an aggression determination by the Security Council. 222 Such a
situation would inevitably undermine the credibility of all the institutions involved and provide an easy basis for observers (hostile or
otherwise) to reject the court's judgment.
Despite their rhetorical force, arguments that the Charter system could not tolerate multiple interpretations of aggression proved
unpersuasive in part because this potential for inconsistent pronouncements already exists in the tripartite UN framework: the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of
Justice may all address the same situation pursuant to their Charter
mandates. In its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
the ICJ confirmed that to the extent that there may once have been a
Charter prohibition of simultaneous action, subsequent practice has
superseded that prohibition. 223
Other policy arguments were not fully explored. It was largely left unsaid in the plenaries that a Council gatekeeper would account for the reality that uses of force are rarely evaluated on the basis of their lawfulness alone; rather political, moral and even

25, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-INF-1 English.pdf.
222. The opposite scenario-where the Council finds aggression, but the court
acquits-would presumably not necessarily cause the same concerns, given that the court
must make a legal detennination based on a particular definition of aggression, admissible
evidence and a penal burden of proof.
223. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 149 (July 9) (noting an increasing tendency
for the Assembly and the Council "to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the
maintenance of international peace and security."); see also Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20) ("The responsibility conferred [on
the Security Council] is 'primary,' not exclusive. . . . The Charter makes it abundantly clear
... that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security. .
. . [T]he functions and power conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not
confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of
recommendations ... [but include] 'decisions' . . . [with] dispositive force and effect.").
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consequentialist considerations inevitably come into play. 224 Preserving a determinative role for the Council in aggression prosecutions would enable the Council to insulate from prosecution uses of
force whose purpose or results may be deemed legitimate or meritorious, even though they may qualify as acts of aggression as understood by Article 8bis(2).
Such tricky situations might include instances of anticipatory
self-defense in the face of an imminent attack; the defense of nationals or hostage rescues; episodes of hot pursuit or the abduction of fugitives; bona fide humanitarian interventions; armed responses to
prior terrorist attacks, which may be directed against non-state actors
or against states harboring terrorist groups or allowing their territory
to be used as bases for terrorist attacks; participation in wars of national liberation; and regional responses to breaches of the peace or
humanitarian crises. Any of these situations might be deemed an act
of aggression within the Article 8bis definition.
Because the law is in flux in these areas, it was argued that
keeping aggression prosecutions dependent on Security Council determinations would have ensured that the court remains consistent
with the current state of international relations, as ultimately determined by the Council. This would ensure some degree of political
consensus on whether a harmful act of aggression had been committed. A Security Council filter would also ensure that legitimate uses
of force were not deterred by the fear that an unfettered Prosecutor or
retaliating state party would launch a prosecution. 225
This set of legal and policy arguments gained little traction in
the face of the Council's inconsistent past practice vis-d-vis state acts
that might be deemed to violate the UN Charter. Many detractors of
a Security Council filter argued that the Council had never declared a
state act to be aggressive. 226 In reality, the Council has classified
conduct as "aggression" on multiple occasions over the years. 227
224.

See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo:

THE Kosovo

REPORT, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm ("The
Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate.").
225. Van Schaack, supra note 2 (discussing potential for the crime of aggression to chill
humanitarian interventions).
226.

See James Nicholas Boeving, Note, Aggression, International Law, and the ICC:

An Argument /br the Withdrawal of Aggression

from

the Rome Statute, 43 COLuM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 557, 567 (2005) ("[T]he Security Council has rarely characterized such acts
as aggression.").
227. See, for example, the string of resolutions condemning the actions of Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa against Angola, Zambia and Lesotho as acts of aggression. See,
e.g., S.C. Res. 326, U.N. Doc. S/RES/326 (Feb. 2, 1973) (S. Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 387, U.N.
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These aggression determinations, however, at times employed
somewhat ambiguous or inconclusive rhetoric. 228 Sometimes members of the P-5 abstained in these determinations; 229 on other occasions, the target state was an easily condemned pariah. 230 In addition,
it is unlikely that all of these examples would qualify as aggression
under the ICC definition. 23 1 In any case, there were as many, if not
more, counter-examples, in which the Council failed to condemn
conduct that would arguably fit the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314,232 even in situations that did not implicate one of the P-5
or a key ally.233 This haphazard practice was cited as evidence that

Doc. S/RES/387 (Mar. 31, 1976) (S. Africa). See generally HISTORICAL REVIEW, supra note

213, at 225-36 (compiling resolutions).
228. For example, in some of the instances the reference to aggression appeared in the
preamble rather than the main text of the resolution. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 386, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/386 (Mar. 17, 1976) (S. Rhodesia). In the alternative, the term was used as an
adjective rather than a noun. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 527, U.N. Doc. S/RES/527 (Dec. 15, 1982)
(South Africa).
229. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, 1988) (U.S. abstention in
a resolution against Israel regarding an assassination in Tunisia); S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (U.S. abstention on resolution condemning Israeli attack on PLO
headquarters in Tunisia). On the Israeli PLO raid, see William E. Smith, Israel's 1500-Miles
Raid, TIME (Oct.
14,
1985), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,
960108,00.html. On the assassination, for which Israel did not claim responsibility, see Jill
Smolowe, Gunned Down in Tunis, TIME, Apr. 25,

1988, http://www.time.com/time/

magazine/article/0,9171,967236,00.html.
230.

See supra note 227 (resolutions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa).

231. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 611,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, 1988) (condemning
Israeli assassination in Tunisia); S.C. Res. 405, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977)
(condemning private mercenary attacks in Benin).
232. Rarely raised publicly, but nonetheless on the forefront of diplomats' minds, were
two events: first, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its coalition partners;
and second, the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, Georgia, which involved the deployment by
Russia of troops, bombing raids, and a partial occupation of Georgia. Neither of these
incidents provoked Council action. The Iraqi invasion did, however, give rise to a joint
declaration by Russia, Germany and France calling for avenues short of war to be pursued.
Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq (Feb. 10, 2003), available at
https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=2003021 1.gb.htm.
The Security Council resolutions surrounding the war in Iraq are compiled here: UN
Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq, CAMPAIGN AGAINST SANCTIONS IN IRAQ,

http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
233. The most oft-cited example was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which was deemed
"a breach of international peace and security" rather than an act of aggression. S.C. Res.
660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990). The Council never denounced Turkey's action
in Cyprus as aggression per se either, although arguably Resolution 3314 would have
supported such a determination.
Both situations did, however, receive Council
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the Council could not be trusted to make unbiased, principled or even
consistent aggression determinations. It was argued that the Council
would be paralyzed by political dissension, which would, in turn,
immobilize the court.234
This criticism of the Council's past practice, while warranted
in some circumstances, failed to acknowledge that there are situations
in which the Council might decline to make an aggression determination on the particular circumstances of a situation, rather than on selfserving grounds. 235 For example, the Council might decline to make
an aggression determination following a minor international scuffle
that might best be resolved through diplomacy without Council action. 236 On the opposite end of the spectrum, there may be situations
where a Council aggression determination might escalate tensions, as
in the volatile Middle East or on the nuclearized Korean Peninsula.
The Council may likewise avoid an aggression determination in conflicts without a clear first mover responsible for launching or escalating the dispute 237 or where there are multiple states that might be in
both aggressive and aggressed postures, as in central Africa. 238 In
addition, there may be situations, including those involving acts of
terrorism by putative non-state actors, where state attribution is difficult on either evidentiary or political grounds, or is only possible with
reference to classified information. In these cases, the Council (if it

condemnation.
See S.C. Res. 353, 1|1| 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/353 (July 20, 1974)
(demanding an end to foreign intervention in Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign troops).
234. June 2005 SWGCA Report, supra note 20,

1| 63-74.

235. Scheffer, supra note 148, at 901 (noting that the Security Council may decline to
make a detennination on aggression as part of its strategy for managing a particular
conflict).
236. Examples where the Council did not intervene include the 1977 Egypt/Libya War;
the 1981 Ecuador/Peru border incident; the 1985 Agacher Strip Incident between Burkina
Faso and Mali; the 2009 Thailand/Cambodia border standoff; and the 2009
Colombia/Venezuela abduction incident.
237. In these mutuality cases, to the extent that the conflict is addressed, the Council
takes a "pox on both your houses" approach. Examples include the Iran/Iraq War (see, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 514, U.N. Doc. S/RES/514 (July 12, 1982) and subsequent resolutions from 1982
to 1987); the Eritrea/Ethiopia War (see, for example, S.C. Res. 1177, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1177
(June 26, 1998) and subsequent resolutions from 1998 to 2000); and the conflict in NagornoKarabakh pitting Azerbaijan against Armenia (see, e.g., S.C. Res. 822, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/822 (Apr. 30, 1993)).
238. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1778, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25, 2007) (approving the
deployment of an international force in eastern Chad and the northeastern region of the
Central African Republic); S.C. Res. 1861, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1861 (Jan. 14, 2009) (raising
concerns about the situation in central Africa).
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even addresses the situation) often condemns the act of violence
without identifying any responsible state. 239 Finally, of course, there
are situations in which an act of violence might violate the UN Charter if analyzed solely on legal grounds but which might otherwise be
deemed legitimate, desirable or justified. These situations might
provoke a rebuke by the Council but no sanction. 240 In any case, past
practice will be of limited use in predicting future Security Council
behavior under the new ICC regime, since no previous determination
that some state party committed an act of aggression had the talismanic status that will exist if and when the amendment denominated
Article 15bis is activated. The Council filter was, in short, relatively
straightforward but distrusted.

2. Alternative Filters: The International Court of Justice and the
General Assembly
The other external filters under consideration-the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly-presented their
own problems. Although the ICJ has never condemned a state for
committing aggression per se, even in the most compelling of circumstances, 241 there is general agreement that it could do so as a the239. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1319, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1319 (Sept. 8, 2000) (calling on
Indonesia to disband militia active in Timor-Leste); S.C. Res. 496, 1| 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/496 (Dec. 15, 1981) (condemning mercenary attacks in the Seychelles often
attributed to South Africa). In December 2008 following the Mumbai attack, a special
committee of the Security Council added the group Lashkar-E-Tayyiba to the list of terrorist
organizations established by Council Resolution 1267, but otherwise did not implicate
Pakistan in the attack. See S.C. Res. 1822,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008)
(setting forth additional state obligations vis-A-vis listed groups and individuals); S.C. Res.
1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); 1267 Comm., The Consolidated List
Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin
Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated
with Them (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf.
240. Examples include the 1998 intervention in Kosovo, the 1981 attack by Israel
against Iraqi reactors (see, e.g., S.C. Res. 487, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981));
and the United States's attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings.
See generally Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to TerroristAttacks: The Bombing
of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537 (1999), Ved P. Nanda, NATO's Armed
Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10 U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD.

1

(1999/2000).
241. Even in the Armed Activities in the Congo case-where Uganda launched an
invasion and air attacks and eventually occupied parts of the territory of the Democratic
Republic of Congo-the court did not find aggression per se. Armed Activities on Territory
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oretical matter if confronted with the right facts. 242 Logistical problems, though, loomed large with respect to a potential ICJ filter. In
particular, it was unclear if the ICJ would make the necessary determination pursuant to its advisory or contentious jurisdiction-neither
of which provides a clean or particularly efficient option. Activating
the contentious jurisdiction would likely require all relevant stateS243
to have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to Article
36(2) of the ICJ Statute. 244 These States Parties could potentially refer a matter interpartes that might require an aggression determination by the ICJ pursuant to Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute. 245 The
relevant States Parties may also have been parties to unrelated bilateral treaties-such as friendship, commerce and navigation treatiesthat designate the ICJ as the arbiter of any dispute arising out of the
interpretation or application of the treaty. In the past, such treaties

of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 227 (Dec. 19) (holding the
"obligations arising under the principles of non-use of force and non intervention [were]
violated by Uganda" and concluding that Uganda's conduct constituted a "grave violation of
the prohibition on the use of force expressed" in Article 2(4)).
242. See Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime ofAggression: Is There an Answer to the
International Criminal Court's Dilemma?, 65 A.F. L. REV. 229, 252-53 (2010); Troy
Lavers, [Pre]determiningthe Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come To Allow the
InternationalCriminalCourt Its Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 299, 311 (2008).
243. See, e.g., Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., N. Ir. &
U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32 (June 15). The Monetary Gold case might be read to require all
states involved in a putative act of aggression to have accepted the court's contentious
jurisdiction before the court could have exercised any filter function assigned to it. But see
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124, 140 (June 2); Legality of Use of
Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 259, 274 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v.
Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. 363, 374 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Ger.), 1999 I.C.J. 422,
433 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. It.), 1999 I.C.J. 481, 493 (June 2); Legality
of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. 542, 558 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Port.), 1999 I.C.J. 656, 672 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain),
1999 I.C.J. 761, 774 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 826, 840
(June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916, 926 (June 2) (allowing
case to go forward against other members of NATO in the absence of Spain and the United
States, which had lodged reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention on which
Serbia & Montenegro had premised jurisdiction).
244.

Sixty-six such declarations have been lodged with the court.

Declarations

Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE,

http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1 &p3=3 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
245. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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have provided jurisdiction in contentious cases involving uses of
force. 246
The ICJ's advisory jurisdiction is limited by Article 65(1) of
the ICJ Statute to "any legal question." 247 Arguably, a determination
of whether a particular state engaged in an act of aggression presents
a host of quintessentially factual questions given all the variables involved. At the same time, the ICJ has interpreted this language rather
loosely by noting that a question relating to "the legal consequences
arising from a given factual situation" under the rules and principles
of international law remains a legal question. 248 As a result of this
approach, several of the ICJ's advisory opinions have been criticized
as disguised contentious cases. 249 The ICJ has even issued advisory
opinions in situations in which it pronounced upon the legal obligations and compliance of states not subject to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. 250 That said, the ICJ acknowledges the relevance of state
consent vis-A-vis its advisory jurisdiction but suggests that it is apposite to the propriety of the ICJ's exercise of jurisdiction rather than its
legal competence to do so. 25 1
The ICJ may give an advisory opinion at the request of the
organs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly or the
Security Council, or specialized agencies authorized to make such a
request with the caveat that the request must fall within the scope of
activity of the requesting entity. 252 The most likely source of a request for an advisory opinion on the crime of aggression would have
inevitably been either the Council or the Assembly. The use of the
246. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) (basing jurisdiction
on the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United
States and Iran).
247.

ICJ Statute, supra note 245, art. 65.

248. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 153 (July 9). In that case, the
court at the request of the General Assembly declared that parts of the wall built by Israel
violated international law. The court had to find a number of facts in connection with this
opinion, many of them adverse to Israel, which had not consented to the court's jurisdiction.
249. See Sean Murphy, Self Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse
Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 74 (2005).
250. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136.
251.

Id. at 157-58.

252.

See generally Dapo Akande, The Competence ofInternational Organizationsand

the Advisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 437 (1998)

(discussing the court's advisory jurisdiction and critiquing the court's approach in Legality
ofthe Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).).
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term "may" in Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute also indicates that the
ICJ is not required to give an advisory opinion when asked. 253 Only
"compelling reasons," however, should lead the ICJ to refuse to give
such an opinion,254 and the ICJ has never declined an advisory opinion on this discretionary basis. 255 Perhaps now that the ICJ's docket
is well-filled, it will be less inclined to accept requests for advisory
opinions, although it would likely have been hard pressed to reject a
request when the work of the ICC depended on the resolution of the
question posed. 256 As a practical matter, there is no way to force implicated States Parties to participate in, or assist, any such proceedings before the ICJ.257
For its part, the General Assembly filter-though deemed a
more "democratic" solution by some 258-received only tepid support.259 Assuming the Charter could be read to authorize a General
253.

Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 156 ("the Court has discretionary power to

decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions ofjurisdiction are met.").
254. Id.
255. The one time the court declined to give an advisory opinion was on jurisdictional
grounds in response to a 1993 request by the World Health Organization, which sought an
opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. The court ruled that the subject matter of the
request was outside the scope of the WHO's activities. The General Assembly then
submitted the same question to the court a year later in Resolution 49/75K (Dec. 15, 1994),
and the court proceeded to issue the requested opinion. Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). The Permanent Court of
Justice, by contrast, did in one case decline to give an Advisory Opinion in a matter based on
"the very particular circumstance of the case, among which were that the question directly
concerned an already existing dispute" and one of the parties objected to the proceedings and
refused to take part in any way. See Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 235
(referring to Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (series B) No. 4). In the Wall Advisory
Opinion, however, the court noted that "the lack of consent to the Court's contentious
jurisdiction by interested States had no bearing on the Court's jurisdiction to give an
advisory opinion." Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 157. In this regard, Eastern
Carelia may be said to have been effectively overruled, or at least confined to its facts, in
favor of a form of de facto compulsory advisory jurisdiction.
256.

See Beth Van Schaack, International Court of Justice Roundup, INTLAWGRRLS

(FEB. 28, 2011), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2011/02/international-court-of-justice-round
-up.html (discussing current docket).
257. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety (Jan. 30, 2004) (declining to discuss merits of the advisory opinion on the grounds
that the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the request for an advisory opinion),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1579.pdf.
258.

259.
filter).

Schaeffer, supra note 109, at 432.

See Trahan, supra note 80, at 62 (noting loss of support for General Assembly
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Assembly filter process as a function of the Assembly's recommendatory powers, 260 the specter of politicization loomed large with this
option. While many participants argued that a Security Council filter
would indelibly politicize the court, others argued that assigning any
role to the General Assembly in an aggression prosecution would
render the proceedings equally if not more politicized (and potentially paralyzed) given the fractious nature of that body. 261
Although these alternative filters appeared to present points of
potential compromise, the principles underlying the positions of the
P-5 and the proponents of an independent ICC were ultimately irreconcilable. Indeed, if there was any collective red line amongst the P5's diverse set of interlocutors it was that the ICC must remain liberated from Security Council control beyond Article 16, even in the
context of the crime that touches most closely on the Council's prerogatives. 262 For their part, the P-5 viewed any erosion of exclusivity
as an end run around the UN Charter and the veto power. 263
This debate, which occurred against the backdrop of a persistent yet faltering Security Council reform movement, 264 surfaced intense antipathy toward the Council. 265 Although the Chair and President retained Alternative 1 (the exclusive Security Council filter) in
Article 15bis until the final days of the negotiations in Kampala, this
was due solely to the status of the states advocating it and not because Alternative 1 enjoyed any sort of broad-based support among

260.

See supra text accompanying note 213.

261. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court To Punish
Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551, 563 (2007).
262. See also Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Sess., Jan.
29-Feb. 1, 2007, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 25,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/5/35, Annex II (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp-docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-35_English.pdf (recounting arguments as to the
importance of ensuring the court's independence from political bodies).
263.

Id. 26.

264. See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004), at

1|

244-65; see generally BARDO FASSBENDER, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO:

A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998)

(discussing Security Council reform proposals).
265. Brazil, which happened to hold a rotating spot on the Security Council while these
debates were ongoing in Kampala, has been a leader in this effort, but it undercut its
credibility at the Conference by virtue of its vote against Iranian sanctions. See S.C. Res.
1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
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negotiating parties. 266 In the end, the Chair and President could not
credibly include Alternative 1 in the final Non-Paper or package
without provoking a collective backlash that would likely have sunk
the negotiations. By holding out the possibility of an exclusive Security Council filter until the last minute, the Chair and President kept
the P-5 engaged and set the stage for them to accept as consolation
prizes the opt-out clause and the exclusion of Non-Party States from
the aggression provisions. 267
While the elimination of an exclusive Security Council filter
in Article 15bis was not a surprise, it was somewhat unexpected in
Article 15ter, addressing Security Council referrals. The record does
not disclose which state proposed this change. 268 None of the P-5
spoke out for or against it in public, even though it removed a Council control mechanism. Without such a filter, it is unlikely that the
Security Council will refer a situation involving acts of aggression to
the court if it does not also support the leveling of aggression charges
(or at least accept their possibility). This lack of a filter power
threatens to reduce Security Council referrals, diminish the role of
the Council in the work of the ICC and thus potentially reduce the
number of cases coming before the court involving other core crimes
in addition to aggression. There may especially be a reduction in
cases involving Non-Party States, which can only be triggered by the
Council. This result may have been the purpose of removing the filter in Article 15ter all along. It remains to be seen whether the
Council will attempt to use its remaining control mechanisms to constrain the Prosecutor's ability to bring aggression charges to the
court.
B. Existing Security Council ControlMechanisms

The ICC is already subject to significant Security Council
control, both in terms of the Council's power to refer situations involving Non-Party States under Article 13(b) and in deferring prose-

266. Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 886 (noting the inevitability ofan alternative filter in
the event of Security Council inaction).
267. Id. (noting also that the specific reference to Article 16 of the Statute and the
delayed activation of the amendments altogether were also aimed at placating the P-5).
268. Barriga and Glover note only that the idea was put to the President in bilateral
consultations. Barriga & Glover, supra note 98, at 11.
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cutions in a situation altogether under Article 16.269 The latter provision demonstrates that the principle of separation of powers is already imperfectly incorporated in the ICC Statute. Adding the crime
of aggression to the court's subject matter jurisdiction promised to
revive and indeed sharpen debates about the optimum balance between Security Council hegemony in situations involving threats to
and breaches of the peace and the principle of judicial independence.
Some states offered an additional control mechanism for the Security
Council in the form of the red light proposal, which would have empowered the Council to reject ex ante any aggression charges while
allowing other charges to go forward to ensure some measure of accountability for international crimes committed in a particular situation. Nonetheless, the final amendments add nothing to the Council's
textual ability to control which charges the Prosecutor may bring in
any particular situation.
None of the factions in Kampala rallied behind the red light
270
option.
Although the proposal was seemingly offered as a concession to the Security Council to give it more flexibility than Article
16, the P-5 rejected the offering given that it was pitched as a check
on a Pre-Trial Chamber filter and an alternative to an exclusive Security Council filter. Although the P-5 might have preferred an additional red light function rather than having to fall back on the power
already vested in them by Article 16,271 they could not express support for such a provision without undermining their principled arguments on Council exclusivity. Even though the red light proposal
seemed at first glance to respect, if not enhance, the Security Council's powers, it still raised the potential for inconsistent pronouncements by pitting a political body against a judicial one at the very
time that the international community should be united against an act
of aggression. The timing of the proposed red light function was
269. Article 13 allows the Security Council to refer a situation to the court. See supra
note 69. Article 16 allows the Council to defer a prosecution for one year. See supra note
26.
270. Coracini, supra note 42, at 762 (noting elimination of the red light option); see
also Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th Sess., Nov.
14-22, 2008, Report of/the Special Working Group on the Crime ofAggression,

21-22,

U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20, Annex III (2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20-Ann.11120English.pdf (describing limited support for
the red light proposal).
271. The Council veto would have operated similarly under both the red light function
and an Article 16 deferral: a single veto would allow a prosecution to go forward.
Presumably, however, it would have been more difficult to invoke the red light considering
its more pennanent nature.
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such that it would force a matter onto the Council's agenda six
months or so after the events in question. The concern was that this
could divert the Council from its response to that particular threat to
the peace as well as from other emergent crises. The ABS coalition
for its part objected to giving the Security Council another control
mechanism that could stymie aggression prosecutions. 272 With neither side in support, the proposal ultimately fell away. 273
And so, the Council's only control mechanisms over aggression prosecutions are those already found in Article 13(b) and Article
16. Article 16 at first glance appears to be a rather blunt instrument
for the Security Council to influence what charges may be brought
before the court in a particular situation, since by its terms it seems to
result in the deferral of the investigation and prosecution of an entire
situation altogether rather than operating as a line item veto. 274
272. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Official Records on its 7th
Sess., Nov. 14-22, 2008, Report ofthe Special Working Group on the Crime ofAggression,
1| 22, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20, Annex 111 (2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp-docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-7-20-Ann.II
20English.pdf.
273. As an alternative to the red light proposal, former Ambassador for War Crimes,
David Scheffer, advanced a proposal in Kampala that was premised on three potential
actions by the Security Council: an affirmative determination of an act of aggression; a
negative determination of an act of aggression; and no detennination of whether or not an
act of aggression was committed. In the event of an affirmative or positive determination,
the filter would allow an aggression prosecution to proceed. In the event of a negative
determination, the filter would operate to block an aggression prosecution from proceeding.
The Pre-Trial Chamber would act as a filter only in the event that the Council did not make a
determination of either character. The proposed language read as follows with changes to
the Chair's Non-Paper in bold and strike through:
(4)bis Where no suet determination of either character is made within [6]
months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may proceed with the
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial
Chamber has authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a
crime of aggression in accordance with the procedure contained in Article 15
unless the Security Council has directed otherwise.
Ambassador Scheffer's Proposal (on file with the author).
Under Ambassador Scheffer's model, the Council would then have a second red light
opportunity to block the prosecution. The proposal raised complex questions of Council
practice, particularly with respect to the voting rules. In particular, the model seemed to
contemplate too many scenarios that would allow the Pre-Trial Chamber to serve as the filter
(as where neither a negative nor a positive determination was made) to be acceptable to the
P-5. See generally Scheffer, supra note 148, at 901-02 (discussing his proposal in
Kampala).
274.

See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

I THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED TEXT 132 (2005) (arguing

that the Council can only suspend the prosecution of an entire situation). Murphy notes that
Article 16 also requires the Council to extend a benefit to a potential aggressor state at the

HeinOnline -- 49 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 575 2010-2011

576

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[49:505

Nonetheless, the intense controversy 275 surrounding Security Council
Resolutions 1422276 and 1487277 suggests that the Council might at
exact point when the Council is trying to bring that state back into compliance.

Sean

Murphy, The Crime ofAggression As Adopted by the ICC First Review Conference: A Step

Forvard? 12 (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript).
275. See El Zeidy, supra note 26, at 1519 23; Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of
Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002), 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 85 (2003) (discussing the

controversy surrounding resolution 1422).
276. In June 2002 (just shy of two weeks before the ICC Statute entered into force), the
United States vetoed a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina out of fear that
participating U.S. nationals would be subjected to prosecution for war crimes before the ICC
(even though the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia would likely
have had primary jurisdiction). At this time, the United States sought passage of a Chapter
VII resolution that would have imposed a permanent bar on the prosecution of any United
States peacekeeper in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the resolution did not garner support.
Detractors argued that the proposed resolution was ultra vires under the Charter in the
absence of an extant threat to the peace, amounted to an unlawful revision of Article 16
(which is ostensibly meant to be used on a case-by-case basis after an investigation has
begun) and undermined the credibility of the Council and the integrity of the ICC. The
United States then sponsored a resolution invoking Article 16 and exempting all United
Nations peacekeepers ex ante from ICC jurisdiction for one year. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002). The operative language of Resolution 1422 is:
1. Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute,
that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions
relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with
investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council
decides otherwise....
See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (July 10, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/pv4568e.pdf and http://www.un.org/Docs/pv4568el.pdf (Security
Council debates); see also Bryan MacPherson, Authority of the Security Council To Exempt
Peacekeepers from International Criminal Court Proceedings,ASIL INSIGHTS (July 2002),

http://www.asil.org/insigh89.cfm- (discussing the controversy over the legality of Resolution
1422). The Bosnian peacekeeping mission was thereafter immediately renewed. See S.C.
Res. 1423, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1423 (July 12, 2002).
277. S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003) (renewing Resolution 1422
with abstentions by France, Germany and Syria). Resolution 1487 was not renewed a year
later because it expired right as photographs from Abu Ghraib began to be released, and it
was clear that the United States could not gamer the political support it would need in the
Council to extend Resolution 1422 again. See Marco Roscini, The Fforts to Limit the
International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Comparative Study, 5 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBS. 495, 500 (2006). Similarly,

resolution 1497 authorized the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia and provided
that "current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state, which is not a party
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or
related to the Multinational Force or United Nations stabilization force in Liberia, unless
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some point attempt to use its Article 16 power 278 (and perhaps its Article 13(b) referral power for that matter 279) more surgically to dictate
which charges may be brought in particular situations or cases. 280 It
remains to be seen to what extent the terms of the ICC Statute constrain the Council's exercise of its Chapter VII powers and whether
the court would override the Council's preference that no aggression
charges be considered within a particular situation. 281

such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State." S.C. Res.
1497, J| 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
278. Besides the two peacekeeping resolutions, the Council has yet to invoke Article 16
as it was originally conceived. Efforts to convince the Council to defer the prosecution of
Sudanese President Al Bashir did not bear fruit. See Press Release, Security Council,
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Says Security Council Should Be Prepared for
"United Action" To Ensure Execution of Sudanese President's Arrest Warrant, U.N. Doc.
SC/9516 (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9516
.doc.htm (discussing debates about potential deferral).
279. When the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the court in
Resolution 1593 (2005), it also added language to the effect that any nationals from a NonParty State involved in Sudan would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
contributing state. "The inclusion of this paragraph constituted the price to pay in order to
secure the abstention of the US in the [referral] vote." Roscini, supra note 277, at 501 n.12.
280. See Scheffer, supra note 148, at 904 (arguing that the Council may make targeted
aggression referrals); see also Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (July 22,
2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA5AA9B6DIE96C/0/ICCASP3Resl English.pdf (confirming the independence of the court).
But see Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Can the Security Council Extend the
ICC's Jurisdiction?,in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 572
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that the Relationship Agreement between the
ICC and the United Nations precludes the Council from extending the jurisdiction of the
court).
281. See U.N. Charter art. 125 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.");
id. art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."). Although these
articles technically only apply to states and not to international organizations with separate
legal personality, it could be argued that the court is ultimately a creature of states acting
collectively. See Nigel White & Eric Myjer, Editorial, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 145,

145 (2002).
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C. State Consent
Both the opt-out and Non-Party State exclusion provisions are
premised on the principle of state consent, the defining feature of
Box 3 and a component of Box 1. Both Boxes require a showing that
the putative aggressor state had ratified or accepted the aggression
amendments. This concept eventually rose to the forefront of the negotiations as an appealing way to limit the court's ability to exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression without further privileging
the Security Council or forsaking aggression prosecutions to power
politics. It was always assumed that the Security Council could refer
a situation involving potential aggression charges to the court independent of whether the relevant state(s) were parties to the Statute or
had accepted the aggression amendments. But the question of state
consent became an issue insofar as non-Security Council triggers and
filters were under consideration. In many respects, the debates over
the appropriate entry into force provisions were really proxy arguments about consent given the strong legal and textual arguments in
favor of the Negative Understanding of Article 121(5). This Understanding was premised on state consent because it provided that additions to the Statute would not apply to the nationals of states that did
not ratify or accept the amendments.
The theory espoused by proponents of Box 3 for requiring
state consent was that the crime of aggression implicates state sovereignty more than any of the other three crimes because a state's act of
aggression serves as a predicate for the prosecution of an individual
for the crime of aggression. 282 None of the other ICC crimes is so
dependent on state action. Although it may be the product of a state
policy, genocide may also be committed by private individuals. 283
War crimes occurring in international armed conflicts will have likely been committed by agents of the state, but most of the same crimes
are also prosecutable when committed by non-state actors in the context of a non-international armed conflict.284
282. But see Amann, supra note 70, at 191-93 (arguing that the three original ICC
crimes implicate state sovereignty as well).
283. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4,
adopted by G.A. Res. 260 (111), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(111) (Dec. 9, 1948) ("Persons
committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.");
see Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons)
(June 1, 2001) (discussing genocide charges against businessmen).
284. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8. Given the almost complete convergence of
war crimes committed in international and non-international armed conflicts, conflict
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Even when war crimes are committed by state actors, however, the state is not directly implicated in any element of the crime
other than the circumstantial element concerned with the classification of the conflict, although the court is encouraged to focus on
those war crimes that are in fact part of a "plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes." 285 A prosecution for
crimes against humanity as that offense is formulated in the ICC
Statute implicates state action the most: a conviction requires proof
that a state or organization was acting pursuant to a plan or policy
against a civilian population. 286 Nonetheless, the perceived exceptionality of the crime of aggression as a function of state action supported arguments in favor of premising jurisdiction on state consent.
The centrality of the determination of a state act of aggression
to a prosecution for the crime of aggression invokes a foundational
principle governing the jurisdiction of international adjudicative organizations. This was first articulated in Monetary GolcP 87 and later
classification has become virtually irrelevant from the perspective of penal responsibility for
all but a handful of war crimes. This convergence was tightened in Kampala with the
adoption of the Belgian amendment to Article 8, which allowed certain weapons crimes to
be prosecuted in non-international anned conflicts for the first time. See Res. RC/Res.5
(June 10, 2010), U.N. Doc. RC/Res.5, available at http:/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf.
285.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(1).

286. Article 7(3) of the ICC Elements of Crimes states that
"[a]ttack directed against a civilian population" in these context elements is
understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of
acts referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is
understood that "policy to commit such attack" requires that the State or
organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian
population.
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(2000), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/724/27/pdf/
N0072427.pdf?OpenElement.
287. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. U.S., U.K. & Fr.), 1954 I.C.J.
19 (June 15). In Monetary Gold, the ICJ was asked to determine whether the United
Kingdom or Italy had a superior claim to Albanian gold that had been held by Italy but
seized by Germany during World War II. Italy claimed the gold as reparations for damage
done by Gennany; the United Kingdom sought the gold for the partial execution of the ICJ's
Corli Channel judgment. However, Albania was not a party to the case before the ICJ. In
dismissing the case, the ICJ ruled that international tribunals cannot adjudicate a matter in
which the very subject matter of the dispute involves the legal interests of states that are not
before it. Albania would not have been bound by any judgment had the ICJ reached the
merits; nonetheless, the ICJ held that Albania was a necessary and indispensable party to the
proceedings, as its legal interests in the matter would have been sufficiently implicated.
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re-affirmed in the Case ConcerningEast Timor.288 According to this
principle, an international tribunal is not competent to pronounce upon the rights and duties of states absent their consent.289 In other
words, a state cannot be forced to submit to international jurisdiction. 290 To be sure, it might be argued that the principle does not apply to international criminal tribunals, such as the ICC, that do not
strictly assert jurisdiction over states. 29 1 Indeed, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals pronounced on acts of aggression committed by
Germany and Japan, although the definition of crimes against the
peace did not technically require such a determination. 292 Neither
288. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30). In East Timor, the ICJ was
asked to invalidate a treaty between Australia and Indonesia, which had purported to resolve
questions surrounding sovereignty over the Timor Gap. Indonesia had been occupying
Timor-Leste since 1975. Portugal-claiming to be exercising its duties as the administering
power of Timor-Leste-argued that Indonesia's unlawful occupation of the island precluded
Australia from entering into a treaty with Indonesia concerning Timorese resources. Rather,
Portugal argued that only the administrating power could enter into treaties on Timor-Leste's
behalf Australia had recognized the de facto incorporation of Timor-Leste into Indonesia
since 1978, although it had a standing objection to the manner in which the incorporation
was effectuated. Australia argued that in addressing Portugal's claims, the ICJ would be
required to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's entry into and continuing presence in
Timor-Leste. The court declined to rule on Portugal's claims, holding that to do so would
require it to pronounce upon the legality of the initial use of force by Indonesia, a state not
before the ICJ.
289. See generally Dapo Akande, ProsecutingAggression: The Consent Problem and
the Role of the Security Council (May 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstract id= 1762806.
Akande makes a connection between the consent
principle and the necessity of a Security Council trigger or exclusive referral in the context
of a situation in which the actions of non-consenting states serve as the predicate to a
prosecution for the crime of aggression. He frames his Council-exclusivity argument not on
the imperative of ensuring consistency with the Charter framework but rather as a function
of ensuring that the ICC is in compliance with legal rules governing the jurisdiction of
international judicial institutions generally. In other words, a Council override of state
consent goes to the very foundations of judicial competence. In his view, having a Council
filter (and indeed, he goes further to suggest that there should be an exclusive Council
trigger for aggression) actually serves to expand the power of the ICC by essentially getting
around the Monetary Gold principle, which would otherwise constrain the court when the
conduct of non-consenting states is at issue.
290. In Alien Tort Statute litigation, United States courts have made clear that political
leaders can be sued in their individual capacity, and the state is not a necessary or
indispensible party that must be joined.
291.

See Akande, supra note 289.

292. See London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280
(defining "crimes against the peace" as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
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Tribunal enjoyed the consent of the aggressor state, unless Japan and
Germany can be considered to have constructively consented to jurisdiction by virtue of their defeat, subjugation and occupation. 293
Nonetheless, where an aggression prosecution is directly premised on
a determination of state action, the Monetary Gold principle seems
highly relevant.
Arguably, all states implicated in an act of aggression, as either aggressors or victims, would need to have consented for the ICC
to have jurisdiction. 294 This might require the consent of a number of
states involved in coalition warfare. Indeed, the aggression negotiations were always premised on a rather artificial classic binary conflict, with a clear aggressor and aggressed state. This simplistic
model ignores the fact that many conflicts involving coalitions on
both sideS295 lack a proverbial first mover or may position states in
both aggressive and aggressed postures, such as in the Great Lakes
region of Africa. The ICC will have to determine which states' consent is required before any aggression prosecution goes forward.
The imperative of state consent vis-a-vis prosecutions for the
crime of aggression is especially compelling given that there is no
apparent mechanism for the aggressor state to intervene in a criminal
prosecution before the ICC (except in the complementarity phase, 296
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the

foregoing").
293. Akande, supra note 289. Akande notes that it could be argued that the post-World
War II tribunals were essentially domestic occupation courts that would not be bound by the
Monetary Gold principle. Id.
294. This harkens back to the classic si omnes clauses of the international humanitarian
law treaties of yesteryear. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field art. 24, July 6, 1906, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/180?OpenDocument ("The provisions of the present
Convention are obligatory only on the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or
more of them. The said provisions shall cease to be obligatory if one of the belligerent
Powers should not be signatory to the Convention"). The Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the
application of the si omnes clause in Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the ground
that the treaty's provisions constituted customary international law and were thus binding on
non-signatories on that basis. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 248-49 ("But the
Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt 'to revise the general laws and customs of
war,' which it thus recognized to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the
Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory
of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in art. 6(b) of the Charter.").
295. See Patricia A. Weitsman, Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How
Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars, 4 STRATEGIC
STUDIES Q. 113 (Summer 2010) (discussing modem multilateral warfare).
296.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, arts. 17-19.
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where the merits of whether an act of aggression was committed have
no bearing, or when an in situ investigation is ordered 297). To be
sure, it could be argued that there are no direct or binding implications to an ICC determination that a state has committed an act of aggression. The ruling, for example, will carry no resjudicataeffect in
any subsequent inter-state adjudication. This argument ignores the
expressive force of a judicial determination, which will inevitably
carry great moral weight in dealings and negotiations between the
relevant parties and the international community and will in any case
have evidentiary significance in any subsequent inter-state dispute.
Moreover, a declaration of rights standing alone is often conceived of
as a remedy in international adjudications, so an aggression determination by the ICC will not be without impact. 298
As state consent emerged as the principle around which a
consensus on the aggression amendments began to coalesce, the P-5
were hard-pressed to advance counterarguments, especially given the
centrality of state consent in public international law 299 and the apparent willingness of their allies to voluntarily relinquish, or at least
encumber, what may be considered core prerogatives of state sovereignty. 300 The P-5 marshaled arguments to the effect that States Parties could not consent their way out of prior commitments to the UN
297.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 57(d)(3).

298. International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 37(2) ("Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement
of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or another appropriate modality.").
See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("the Court must
declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
This declaration is . . . in itself appropriate satisfaction."); Golder v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975) (treating declaratory relief as "adequate just
satisfaction").
299. State consent has historically provided the basis for the formation and binding
nature of international norms (as where states voluntarily join treaties, engage in state
practice and articulate opinio juris) as well as for the jurisdiction of international institutions.
See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("the rules of law
binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions
or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law. . . . Restrictions upon the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed."). But see Alain Pellet, The
Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in InternationalLaw-Making, 12 AusT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 22 (1988-89) (arguing that consent does not underlie the formation of customary
international law). See generally J. Shand Watson, State Consent and Sources of
International Obligation, 86 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 108, 112 (1992) (defending classical
theory).
300. See Amann, supra note 70, at 205 (noting how states relinquish power to prosecute
their nationals when they create international tribunals).
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Charter framework and their delegation of power and responsibility
to the Security Council and its system of collective security.
This critique was premised, however, on a robust view of Security Council primacy and exclusivity in the aggression context that
was weakened by subsequent United Nations practice (and the Charter itself to a certain extent). 301 It was also undermined by the opt-out
regime and the determination that the aggression amendments would
not apply to Non-Party States. These two developments made it difficult for the P-5 to credibly attack the amendments. The P-5 fell
back on arguments that allowing states to subject themselves to an
aggression regime would impede coalition building. The theory was
that potential coalition partners would be subject to different degrees
of exposure to prosecution before the court. They may also exhibit
different levels of tolerance for the uncertainty inherent to the aggression provisions. These variations among states may make it more
difficult for a single state, especially a Non-Party State, to pull together a coalition. The fact that the aggression provisions may exert
a chilling effect on collective uses of force may paradoxically lead to
more unilateral actions by states that are not subject to the aggression
provisions. Nonetheless, this argument was not compelling enough
to the other parties to overcome the obvious utility and attraction of a
state consent regime.
In the face of this, the P-5 were left with arguments that the
choice to accept jurisdiction was simply deontologically wrong and
that States Parties should be protected from themselves-strong, and
no doubt alienating, paternalistic arguments. 302 It could not be credibly argued that states in support of the aggression amendments were
demonstrating a lack of decisional capacity. And, while there are areas in the law where we deny full agency, 303 a state submitting its nationals to potential prosecution for aggression can hardly be one of
301.

See supra text accompanying notes 211-217.

302.

See Chin Liew Ten, Paternalism Strong Paternalism, MILL ON LIBERTY:

A

VICTORIAN WEB BOOK (2001), http://www.victorianweb.org/philosophy/mill/ten/ch7b.htm1
("the practice of strong paternalism easily becomes a cloak for the imposition of our values
on those who are coerced.").
303. For example, according to Article 7 of the Third Geneva Convention governing
prisoners of war, "[p]risoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety
the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred
to in the foregoing Article, if such there be." Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 7, Aug. 12, 1949, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75acl25641e004a9e68;
see also
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690) (arguing that a person cannot consent

to enslavement).
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them in light of the burgeoning system of international criminal justice. To be sure, the preservation of sovereignty, the maintenance of
a sphere of inscrutable domestic jurisdiction and freedom from outside intervention are presumed to be shared values that historically
formed the basis for the international legal order. 304
Increasingly, however, states are voluntarily and deliberately
subjecting themselves (or their nationals) to international institutions
(including human rights and trade tribunals) that are collectively
eroding these prerogatives. 305 These classical sovereign values are
thus giving way to other more cosmopolitan, indeed even communitarian, impulses that suggest the emergence (or at least a glimmer) of
a new shared political morality. Like any system of government or
institution, states involved in the aggression negotiations evinced a
willingness to subject themselves to a system that will both constrain
and, it is likely hoped, protect them. In the face of this trend, the P-5
had difficulty countering arguments premised on state consent.
1. The Opt Out
The opt-out provision contained in Article 15bis(4)306
emerged as one of the two prices to be paid by the ABS coalition for
gaining the Pre-Trial Division filter in lieu of an exclusive Security
Council filter in Article 15bis. Although no doubt a bitter pill for
these states to swallow, it had some appeal. For one, it suggested a
way to attempt to avoid the unwelcome implications of the Negative
Understanding of the second sentence of Article 121(5),307 which was
based essentially on an opt-in regime that enabled States Parties to
passively avoid the aggression provisions by simply failing to ratify
or accept them. The opt out seems sub silentio premised on a Positive Understanding of Article 121(5) since Article 15bis(4) implies

304. Gerry Simpson, On the Magic Mountain: Teaching Public InternationalLaw, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 70, 78 (1999).
305. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
1103 (2000) (discussing increased use of international courts to resolve international
disputes).

306. See Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 15bis(4) ("The Court may,
in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, arising from
an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.
The withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by
the State Party within three years.").
307.

See supra note 78.
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that the court can exert jurisdiction over any State Party that has not
lodged an opt-out declaration, regardless of whether that state party
has ratified or accepted the amendments. 308 Under this interpretation
of the second sentence of sub-paragraph (5), all that matters is that
the putative victim state has accepted the amendments. If so, then a
potential crime of aggression involving the territory of the aggressed
state can come before the court regardless of whether the putative
aggressor state party has ratified or accepted the amendments. As a
result, and by default, would-be aggressor States Parties are bound by
the amendments absent their ratification/acceptance so long as any of
the putative victim states are so bound.
Under this scenario, the opt out works to overcome this default by allowing aggressor states to take affirmative action to avoid
the operation of the Positive Understanding and shield their nationals
from prosecution. By flipping the power of inertia in favor of jurisdiction, and requiring an affirmative act on the part of states, the optout clause provides an additional obstacle to those States Parties that
might want to avoid the aggression provisions. It also offers a toehold from which elements of international and domestic civil society
can mount a political shame campaign to encourage states to decline
the opt-out option. This interpretation, however, does considerable
violence to the plain text and logic of the amendment provisions. In
effect, this would enable proponents "to avoid the super-majority requirement of Article 121(4) through use of Article 121(5), but then
make use of Article 121(4)'s approach of binding States Parties that
have not yet ratified or accepted the amendment." 309
The opt out can, of course, be made to work under the Negative Understanding of the second sentence of Article 121(5), but it
does seem a bit awkward. 310 Under the Negative Understanding, the
nationals of States Parties that have not ratified or accepted the
amendments cannot be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. From
a purely cynical perspective, there thus remains no obvious incentive
308. See Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 886 n.10 (noting cryptically that "[t]he final
version of the Understandings no longer contained language on a 'positive' or 'negative'
understanding of Art. 121(5), as this issue was addressed in the opt out regime introduced in
the text.").
309. Murphy, supra note 274, at 3. Murphy blames this lingering ambiguity on the
"lack of rigor" amongst the States Parties in crafting and applying the amendment
provisions. Id.
310. Murphy, however, notes that the opt-out language could be read to defeat the
Positive Understanding of Article 121(5) because it links the opt out to the time when the
State Party ratifies or accepts the amendment and implies that the State Party would face no
exposure to the aggression amendments prior to that point. Id. at 5.
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for a state party to ratify the aggression amendments because the
provisions generate no exposure to such states absent ratification.
One can imagine, however, that States Parties may ratify the amendments only to opt out of them immediately if legislators support the
aggression amendments in theory, but not as applied to their nationals, and want to contribute to the thirty ratifications necessary to
bring the amendments into effect. 311 Such states may want to empower the Security Council to make aggression referrals, which will
only happen once there are thirty ratifications. 312 As a wait-and-see
approach, legislators might also avail themselves of the opt out to
gauge how the court handles aggression prosecutions in early cases
before committing their nationals to potential prosecutions. 313 Or, a
state might later utilize the opt-out option if it perceives that aggression prosecutions have become overly politicized. 314 A state party
may also ratify and then opt out of the amendments in an abundance
of caution given the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of Article 121(5). Indeed, this opt-in/opt-out option gives States Parties the
best of both worlds: by accepting the amendments, they are able to
benefit from the deterrent effect (if any) of the aggression amendments vis-A-vis accepting and non-opting-out States Parties that
might commit an act of aggression against them; at the same time,
their nationals are excluded from prosecution absent a Security
Council referral. 315 In any case, it remains to be seen whether the
court will effectively dismantle the opt out altogether by ruling that
the aggression amendments are governed by the plain language reading of the second sentence of Article 121(5) (or Article 121(4) for
that matter). Although the logic of the opt out certainly tilts in favor
of the Positive Understanding, the Negative Understanding is by far
the most natural and logical interpretation of the text itself, which
puts the utility of the opt out in jeopardy especially in light of the
principle of lenity. 316
311.

Aggression Resolution, supra note 1,Annex 1,arts. 15bis(2), 15ter(2).

312.

Id. at Annex III, para. 1.

313. See Murphy, supra note 274, at 4 (setting forth reasons a State Party may ratify the
amendments and then immediately opt out of them); Trahan, supra note 80, at 80 n.132
(same).
314.

Trahan, supra note 80, at 81 n.132.

315. Manson, supra note 93, at 431. The opt out applies only to prosecutions involving
an act of aggression committed by States Parties and not an act of aggression committed
against such Parties on, for example, their territory. Thus, the operation of the second
sentence of Article 121(5) and the opt out in Article 15bis(4) are not co-extensive or
duplicative.
316.

See supra text accompanying note 195.
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Some ambiguity surrounds the timing and mechanics for exercising the opt out. First, as written, the opt-out provision is geared
toward potential aggressor states, 317 rather than potential victim
states, 318 even though there may be situations in which the latter
would not want the court to prosecute crimes of aggression committed on their territory. Examples of this might be where an investigation or prosecution might antagonize the situation, the dispute has
been satisfactorily resolved through diplomatic channels or the prosecution might require the production of sensitive national security information. Thus, the court will still be able to prosecute acts of aggression committed on the territory of a state party that has opted out
of the amendments, so long as the aggressor state is a State Party that
has not also opted out. 3 19 As a practical matter, however, a case that
does not enjoy the support of the victim state would be exceedingly
difficult to prosecute.
Second, some questions have been raised as to whether a state
party can avail itself of the opt out without subsequently accepting or
ratifying the amendments because the resolution text provides that
the opt-out declaration is to be lodged prior to ratification or acceptance. 320 As a matter of logic, the opt out is likely meant to serve
as an incentive for ratification, but there is little in the record about
the intentions of the ABS group or Canada (or, for that matter, the
members of the Assembly of States Parties that adopted the President's final package) in this regard. In addition, the opt-out option
forms part of the aggression amendments, so presumably it is only
available to those States Parties that ultimately ratify or accept the
amendments. Otherwise, the opt out might be construed as a treaty

317. There had been some discussion of extending an opt out to Non-Party States, which
would have been unique in providing treaty-based rights to Non-Party States. See June 2005
SWGCA Report, supra note 20, 1| 5-9 (discussing opt-out and opt-in options); Int'l
Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Grp. on the Crime of
Aggression, 8th Sess., Nov. 18-26, 2009, Infornmal Inter-SessionalMeeting on the Crime of
Aggression,
40-41, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/INF.2 (2009), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/ASP8/ICC-ASP-8-TNF.2-ENG.pdf.
318. See supra note 296 (referring to acts of aggression committed by the State Party
lodging the opt-out declaration).
319. Murphy, supra note 274, at 5-6 (noting the problem with lack of reciprocity in the
opt out).
320. See Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that "any State Party may
lodge a declaration referred to in article 15 bis prior to ratification or acceptance"). The text
of Article 15bis(4) simply assumes that the opt-out declaration has been submitted prior to
the initiation of a case. Id.

HeinOnline -- 49 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 587 2010-2011

588

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[49:505

reservation, which would be prohibited by Article 120 of the Statute. 321
Third, it is not entirely clear how far in advance of any investigation or prosecution a state party will have to have lodged its declaration to invoke it. Presumably, a state party could not attempt to
ratify the amendments and enter the opt-out declaration after an investigation into potential acts of aggression has already been initiated. 32 2 However, nothing in the text of the amendments would prevent this except the inclusion of the word "previously" in the opt-out
language. 323 The inclusion of the term "previously" implies that an
opt-out declaration is to come in advance of ratification. Since the
definition of the crime of aggression includes the actus reus of
"planning" an act of aggression, 324 the court's jurisdictional ratione
temporis may be extended back in time considerably, which may limit states' ability to game the system with a strategically timed opt out.
Fourth, one can imagine the lodging of an opt out tailored to
certain situations (e.g., with respect to NATO operations, a particular
conflict or a particular adversary). 325 Presumably, if a state can opt
out altogether, it can also declare only a partial opt out pursuant to
the principle that the greater includes the lesser. Finally, an additional ambiguity in the opt-out language concerns situations in which a
potential defendant is a citizen of a state party that has lodged an optout declaration but acted on behalf of a state party that did not.326

321. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, What Exactly Was Agreed in Kampala on the
Crime of Aggression?, EJIL TALK! (June 21, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/what-exactlywas-agreed-in-kampala-on-the-crime-of-aggression/; Coracini, supra note 42, at 778.

322. See Trahan, supra note 80, at 80 n. 132 (arguing that a state might utilize the opt
out on the eve of launching an act of aggression, or an operation that might be perceived as
such).
323. Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex I, art. l5bis(4). Had drafters wanted
to exclude this possibility, they should have included language to the effect that the opt out
was available "irrespective of ratification."
324. Id. Annex I, art. 8bis(1).
325. Murphy, supra note 274, at 5 (questioning whether the opt out involves a binary
choice).
326. Such situations are likely to be rare, but the court already has one case presenting
similar facts. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) who is being prosecuted for crimes committed in the Central African Republic
(CAR). Bemba had been the commander of the Mouvement de Lihration du Congo, one of
the parties in the Second Congo War (1998-2002) in the DRC. In 2002, the then-President
of the CAR Ange-F61ix Patass6 allegedly recruited Bemba to assist him in quashing his own
rebel movement. The charges against Bemba stem from his activities in this capacity rather
than his activities in his own state, the DRC. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-
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Under these circumstances, the court would have to decide if individuals may invoke for their benefit any opt-out declaration filed by
their state of nationality or the state on whose behalf they acted, or
both. Since the opt out is designed to shield state action from scrutiny by the court, the status of the putative aggressor state is likely
more relevant than the home nation of the individual, but this remains
to be determined.
In the end, this provision may prove to have been more useful
to garner consensus in Kampala than for its functionality. This was
the case of its likely inspiration, Article 124 of the ICC Statute, 327 the
so-called "Transitional Provision." 328 That Article allows States Parties to opt out of the war crimes provisions for a single period of seven years. The idea behind Article 124 was to give states that considered themselves to be disproportionally vulnerable to war crimes
charges (due, for example, to their high overseas troop commitments
or regular involvement in ameliorating humanitarian crises) 329 time to
assess the performance of the court before opening themselves up to
potential prosecution for the most probable of charges. 330 The provi01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (June 15, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf.
The involvement of high-level
mercenaries in acts of aggression presents another potential example.
327. See supra note 157.
328. The consideration of Article 124 was the only mandatory agenda item for the
Review Conference. See supranote 157 ("The provisions of this article shall be reviewed at
the Review Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1."). Although
it had been little used, its potential deletion remained controversial. In Kampala, several
States Parties (for example, France and Japan) and Non-Party States (for example, Laos and
the Philippines) argued in favor of its retention as a means to assist other hesitant states in
joining the court. Delegates to the Kampala Conference ultimately left the provision in
place and unchanged to encourage other Non-Party States to join the court. See Res.
RC/Res.4, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.4 (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.4 -ENG.pdf.
329. See John R. Bolton, Remarks to the Federalist Society: The United States and the
International Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002) (noting that "US military forces, civilian
personnel and private citizens are active in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in
almost 100 countries at any given time."), available at http://stage.amicc.org/docs
/Boltonl 1_14_02.pdf; see also Gergana Halpern, The Crime ofAggression and the United
States:

Negotiations of the International Criminal Court, THE AMERICAN NON-

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT (Oct. 1, 2007),

http://www.amicc.org/docs/Crime%/20of/o20Aggression%/"20and%/"2Othe

%20US.pdf.

330. By way of background, Article 124 was essentially the price
accept the final package of provisions revealed at the close of the Rome
During the negotiations, France-along with the United States and
sought a consent-based approach to jurisdiction over war crimes

paid to have France
Conference in 1998.
other delegationsand crimes against
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sion was immediately and vociferously denounced by human rights
groups, 331 though their concerns about its use turned out to be overblown and unfounded. In the end, only two countries-France and
Colombia-have availed themselves of the war crimes opt-out option
to date. 332 France, without explanation, withdrew its opt-out declaration in August 2008.333 Colombia's declaration expired by its own
terms in 2009.334 Other states, such as Burundi, apparently contemplated lodging an Article 124 declaration but declined to take advantage of this option due to internal political dynamics and/or pressure from civil society organizations. 335 Article 124 ultimately had
more impact at Rome in getting the final package accepted than it did
in securing more widespread ratification of the Statute post-Rome.
States parties in favor of enforcing the crime of aggression are no
doubt hopeful that Article 15bis(4) will serve little more than the
same purpose post-Kampala.

humanity that would allow the ICC to prosecute these crimes only with the consent of the
nationality and territorial state, absent a referral by the UN Security Council. As an
alternative proposal, the United Kingdom, with support from the other P-5, proposed an
Optional Protocol that states could ratify to exempt their nationals from war crimes or crimes
against humanity prosecutions. Germany proposed an alternative solution that addressed
only war crimes, was non-renewable, and allowed states to consent to jurisdiction a la carte
over particular war crimes. In the waning days of the Rome Conference, the Bureau
released a carefully balanced package of compromises that included Article 124. See
generally Roger Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court
Consideredat the First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May- 1 June 2010, 2
GOTTINGEN J. INT'L L. 689, 691-92 (2010); Shana Tabak, Note, Article 124, War Crimes,
and the Development of The Rome Statute, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1069 (2009).
331. See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 28, at 10 (calling Article 124 a
"licence to kill"); Colombia's ICC Declaration a "Prelude to Impunity," HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Sept. 5, 2002), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/09/05/colombias-icc-declarationprelude-impunity (critiquing Colombia's Article 124 declaration).
332. Tabak, supra note 330, at 1085-94.
333. Id. at 1087.
334. Delivering on the Promise of a Fair,

Ffjective and Independent Court, Review

Conference qf the Rome Statute, Article 124, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod-articlel24 (last visited Apr. 17, 2011); see also
Tabak, supra note 330, at 1090.
335.

Tabak, supra note 330, at 1094-95.
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2. The Exclusion of Non-Party States
The second price to be paid for the removal of an exclusive
Security Council filter was the provision exempting Non-Party States
from the aggression provisions. 336 Even during the early negotiations
surrounding the ICC, the United States and other states had advocated for the position that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over
the nationals of Non-Party States. 337 As such, Article 12(2), which
enables the court to prosecute crimes committed on the territories of
States Parties in addition to crimes committed by the nationals of
States Parties, was a major disappointment for the U.S. delegation at
Rome and provided one basis for the United States's subsequent rejection of the court. 338 The Non-Party State exclusion in the aggression amendments thus represents a major victory for the United
States and a vindication of its prior position.
The new provision is unique in specifically excluding NonParty States from the terms of a treaty 339 and could be construed as a
disincentive for current non-parties wary of the amendments to join
the court. As a negotiating tactic, it can be considered little more
than a bribe to the P-3 to relinquish Security Council control over aggression prosecutions, as it leaves the nationals of the P-3 immune
from prosecution. Of course, these individuals would likely have
been immune as a practical matter through operation of Article 16,
but the exclusion of Non-Party States grants the P-3 immunity without them having to bear the costs of engaging in self-dealing via their
Article 16 deferral powers. At the same time, the exclusion of NonParty States defuses the ability of these states to critique, or attempt
to influence the interpretation of, the aggression amendments because
such states are entirely excluded from them.

336.

Aggression Resolution, supra note 1, Annex I, art. 15bis(5).

337. In making these arguments, the United States drew on Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: "A treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna Convention, supra note
61, art. 34.
338. See John Bolton, Speech ETo: Reject and Oppose the International Criminal
Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?

THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 37 (1999).

339.

AuST, supra note 71, at 257-58 (discussing the way in which treaties may provide

rights for third states).
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D. Delay
Delaying the adoption of the aggression amendments altogether would no doubt have been preferable to a number of states in
attendance in Kampala. The possibility of a definition-only outcome
remained a distinct possibility during the negotiations, although
many states would have perceived this as a failure of the Review
Conference. 340 Members of the P-5 in particular found complete delay appealing and argued in favor of taking the time to reach a more
solid consensus on the aggression amendments. 34 1 They coupled this
claim with arguments that it was premature to evaluate the court's
success vis-a-vis its current mandate. 342 In particular, it was noted
that the court has yet to reach a verdict in its one case currently on
trial, the other cases are all still in pre-trial proceedings, one of the
defendants has twice been ordered released due to prosecutorial misconduct, 343 the charges against another defendant were not confirmed, 344 the majority of the other arrest warrants remain unexecuted 345 and the court has been mired in important yet peripheral pretrial
rulings. A delay, it was argued, would give the court more time to
perfect its work in its areas of core competency before adding a new
and qualitatively different crime to its repertoire, with no new resources to boot.

340. Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 884 n.4 (noting that some delegations would have
considered a definition-only outcome to be "worse than a problematic full package").
341.

Koh, U.S. Intervention, supra note 36.

342. Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 884 (noting the view that the ICC was not ready to
take on aggression cases).
343. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 17, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Request To Give Suspensive Effect to the Appeal Against Trial Chamber I's
Oral Decision To Release Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (July 23, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc912271.pdf. Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber ruled
that a stay and the release of the defendant was not an appropriate response to the
misconduct; rather, sanctions should be imposed on the prosecutor. Prosecutor v. Lubanga
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 17, Judgment on the Appeal of Prosecutor Against the
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 15 July 2010 To Release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct.
8, 2010), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947862.pdf.
344. Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres
/586COB9F-685C-4AO5-BOEF-702A23A4B6F9.htm.
345. None of the Ugandan defendants is in custody, notwithstanding that Uganda selfreferred the situation involving the Lord's Resistance Army to the court. In the Darfur case,
three rebel defendants appeared voluntarily, but the defendants associated with the
government remain at large, including Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.
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To a certain extent, the P-5's fixation on achieving a delayed
adoption was short-sighted. A review of the trend in the negotiations
since the ICC project was revived reveals the gradual (though not
linear) expansion of the definition of aggression and liberalization of
the jurisdictional regime over the years. 346 Time, in short, has not
been on the side of the P-5. It is thus not clear whether the P-5 could
have achieved a better outcome with more time. It was perhaps just
as likely that time would result in a greater expansion of the court's
ability to prosecute the crime of aggression and a further contraction
of the Security Council's control over the process. More time, however, would certainly have enabled the United States to become more
actively engaged in the negotiations without having to rely on the P4, or the P-2 for that matter, to make its arguments for it.
Notwithstanding a preference for a delay altogether, it soon
became clear that it was virtually inevitable that states would achieve
some measure of completion in Kampala given the almost palpable
momentum toward finishing the work left over from Rome and fulfilling-if only symbolically-the final component of the Nuremberg
legacy. Indeed, the threat to resume the negotiations in New York at
a subsequent meeting of the Assembly of States Parties, or even to
convene another Review Conference in a more accessible locale,
loomed large. Presumably a point was eventually reached at which
all parties concluded that they were at their maximum negotiating
leverage in Kampala, prompting delegates to reach some measure of
completion.
E. StaggeredEntry Into Force
In lieu of total deferral, many of the proposals being tossed
about in Kampala hinged on a delayed activation of the amendments,
either in whole or in part. 347 The ABS proposal 348 broke new ground
by suggesting a springing or staggered entry into force for the various
trigger mechanisms. The vision was that the Council trigger would
346. Early drafts of the aggression provisions, for example, envisioned an exclusive
Security Council filter. See Draft Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30
January in Zutphen, the Netherlands, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 102, at 221, 238 (containing draft Article 10

envisioning filter role).
347. See Wenaweser, supra note 51, at 887 (considering the delayed activation of the
amendments to be of less relevance than other compromises forged in Kampala, such as the
opt out for States Parties and the exclusion of Non-Party States).
348.

See supra text accompanying note 148.
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be operative first to be followed by the eventual activation of other
trigger mechanisms. Supporters argued that this would give the
Council a chance to control aggression prosecutions initially, providing the court with time and space to develop its standards and jurisprudence in tandem with the Council before accepting cases that did
not enjoy the Council's full support. Such a phased entry into force
could hinge on a performance-based evaluation of the first phasewhereby phase two would only be implemented in the event the
phase one proved successful.
Under such a system, phase one would provide an opportunity
for the international community to review the Council's management
of its trigger power, the court's handling of aggression cases, the adequacy of existing resources and the very viability of the provisions.
This would ensure that negotiators did not lock in a scheme that later
proved to be unworkable. State parties would be entitled later to affirmatively launch phase two, perhaps in the context of another Review Conference with an agenda and metrics defined in advance. In
the alternative, phase two could be effectuated automatically after the
passage of a certain amount of time or the ratification by a certain
number of States Parties. The promise of a Review Conference was
also dangled as an incentive to states to accept some provisional operationalization of the crime in exchange for the opportunity to subsequently review the definition of aggression and all the other controversial provisions at a later date.
Surprisingly, perhaps, the P-5 were lukewarm on the idea of
granting the Council the immediate power to activate the court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and delaying the other two
trigger mechanisms. Indeed, it was clear over the course of the negotiations that the P-5 believed that they had little to gain from adding
aggression at all to the ICC Statute. Although the crime of aggression was billed as a judicial tool the Council could use for dealing
with rogue leaders who could not readily be prosecuted for one of the
other three ICC crimes, it was an unwanted addition to the Council's
toolbox. 349 They were perhaps concerned that as soon as the Council
could instigate prosecutions for the crime, it would come under pressure from states and non-governmental organizations to do so in this
or that incident. Moreover, throughout the period of probational jurisdiction, detractors would be gathering fodder for subsequent ar-

349. Alternatively, Murphy notes that the ability to refer matters to the court might
allow the Council to avoid dealing with a matter and escape its responsibilities. Murphy,
supra note 274, at 11.
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guments against Council control over the process, redoubling their
commitment to operationalizing the alternative triggers and filters.
In the end, the final package avoids the hard issues and delays
both Article 15bis and 15ter until a subsequent decision of the Assembly of States Parties. 350 It appears that the different trigger mechanisms may be subject to separate votes; as a result, there is a chance
that only one or the other would be adopted in 2017, with the Security Council trigger being perhaps the most vulnerable to rejection in
this regard. The final draft thus laid the groundwork for a further
erosion of the role of the Council in responding to threats to the
peace. It remains to be seen whether the Assembly of States Parties
will convene a new Review Conference for this decision or simply
add it to the agenda of a regular meeting. It certainly seems that a
decision of this magnitude and importance should be taken at a Review Conference, especially given that the priorities of the court and
global conditions will inevitably change considerably in the next seven years. All that said, the aggression provisions could be amended
in the meantime or the decision could be postponed even further.
F. Activation Mechanism

Going into Kampala, academic commentary and diplomatic
interventions split on which amendment regime governed the aggression amendments. 351 The legal arguments in favor of one interpretation or another were marshaled at the service of political preferences
for the different practical consequences of the competing models.
Three factors in particular governed states' preferences: the speed at
which the amendments would enter into force, the question of state
consent and the application to Non-Party States.
An argument against the application of Article 121(5) was
that the amendments would enter into force piecemeal and only with
respect to the States Parties that had accepted them and that this
would create a potentially confusing patchwork of acceptances that
might stymie aggression prosecutions, especially in situations in
350. ICC Statute, supra note 3, arts. 15bis(3),15ter(3).
351. See, e.g., Roger S. Clark, The International Criminal Court and the Crime of
Aggression: Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute, 41 CASEW. RES.

J. INT'L L. 413 (2009) (discussing controversy over amendment provisions and concluding
that Article 121(4) applies to the crime of aggression); Donald M. Ferencz, Addendum to the
Aggression Issue: Bringing the Crime of Aggression Within the Active Jurisdiction of/the
ICC, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531 (2009) (discussing alternative formulations); see also
supra Part II.I..

HeinOnline -- 49 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 595 2010-2011

596

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[49:505

which multiple states were involved. As compared to Article 121(5),
the operation of 121(4) was always relatively straightforward, 352
which was a perennial argument in its favor. Article 121(4), however, threatened to move the court away from universal ratification if
objecting States Parties exercised their right to withdraw from the
Statute rather than subject their territories to aggression prosecutions.
By contrast, Article 121(5) would enable States Parties that
might object to the aggression provisions to remain members of the
court rather than undertaking the more drastic measure of withdrawing as they might do under an Article 121(4) regime. Article 121(4)
also created opportunities for obstructionism, as a dozen or so holdouts could prevent the amendments from ever entering into force.
Proceeding under Article 121(4) might also unleash a "cold war"
among the Assembly of States Parties, as states jockeyed to achieve,
or hinder, the attainment of seven-eighths ratification. 353 Under these
circumstances, the ratification process would distract States Parties,
and Non-Party States, from more constructive cooperation with the
court.
Negotiations over the operative entry into force language
were complicated by the fact that delegates were at the same time
considering another proposed amendment to the Statute. This was
the proposal by Belgium to add several war crimes to the provisions
governing non-international armed conflicts and better harmonize
those provisions with the war crimes prosecutable in international
armed conflicts. 354 It was understood that absent some principled
reason to treat aggression differently, whatever interpretation adopted
for the addition of the crime of aggression would also govern the
Belgian amendment. 355 The resolution adopting the Belgian amendment contains a literal plain language interpretation of Article 121(5)

352. One open question concerned the fact that the seven-eighths threshold had the
potential to be a moving target as more states joined the ICC Statute. In Kampala, Slovenia
proposed that the threshold be set at the time the aggression amendments were adopted, but
there was nothing in the text to support this interpretation.
353. This prospect was reminiscent of the United States's Article 98 campaign under the
Bush Administration. See generally Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to InternationalLaw: U.S. BilateralAgreements Relating to ICC, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 179, 200 (2003) (discussing the practice of the United States, during the
administration of President George W. Bush, of securing Article 98 agreements promising
that treaty parties would not surrender nationals to the ICC without expressed consent).
354. See supra note 284.
355. Res. RC/Res.5, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.5 (June 10, 2010) available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf.
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and also excludes application to Non-Party States. 356 Arguments
were put forward that the reference to the crime of aggression in the
Statute in Articles 5(2) and 12(1) (which avers that States Parties accept the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all crimes referred to
in Article 5, including aggression) implied some level of preacceptance by States Parties and thus justified a differential understanding of how the crime would enter into force. 357 This, it was argued, necessitated the proposed "understandings." The final resolution adopting the aggression amendments "recalls" both of these
provisions, but contains no Understanding on how the various provisions should be interpreted. 358
Indeed, this seemingly banal issue, which one would have expected to have been resolved at the threshold of the negotiations,
emerged as the final point of contention and the lynchpin of the entire
consensus package. The existence of two possible but fundamentally
different entry-into-force regimes coupled with competing interpretations of the provisions' impact created legal confusion throughout the
negotiations. Although this confusion generated an opening for a
creative, if not unfettered, juggling of elements in an effort to reach a
final consensus, the tendency of particular negotiators to switch back
and forth between the two sub-paragraphs of Article 121 and between
the two interpretations of Article 121(5)359 gave the impression that
the provisions of the ICC Statute have no fixed content or meaning
and thus could be manipulated at will in an effort to forge a consensus or advance a particular agenda. Rather than push for a resolution
of this threshold issue, the Chair prolonged the confusion. This tactic
kept the delegations engaged in the process but also generated costs
by enabling the promulgation of unsustainable proposals that served
only to distract the negotiators. It also yielded a final consensus that
is likely only an illusion of an agreement on what the text dictates.
This question has thus essentially been dumped on the laps of the
court's judges.
Informal negotiations continue on the question of when States
Parties are "bound" by the amendments in the absence of a Security
356. Id. at operative para. 2 ("in respect of a State Party which has not accepted the
amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding the crime covered by the
amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory").
357.

See supra note 94.

358. See Aggression Amendments, supra note 3, pmbl; see also Trahan, supra note 80,
at 64 n.62 (critiquing the delegates for not including a consensus interpretation for the
second sentence of Article 121(5)).
359.

See supra text accompanying notes 74-85.
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Council referral. 360 At stake are two open questions: (1) whether the
nationals of States Parties that do not ratify the amendments may be
prosecuted if such individuals commit the crime of aggression on the
territory of any state and (2) whether a prosecution for the crime of
aggression can go forward where the crime is committed on the territory of a State Party that does not ratify the aggression amendments.
Proponents of the Positive Understanding are raising arguments that
the reference to Article 12 in the adopting resolution of the aggression amendments and the opt-out option have effectively overridden
the plain language of Article 121(5).361 This view-which was not
presented in Kampala or in any prior negotiation-depends on the
piecing together of various statutory snippets though interpretive
sleights of hand that should not fool the judges when confronted with
the plain text of the Statute in light of standard principles of treaty interpretation. 362 And so, the entry into force provisions lurk in the
Statute, threatening to destabilize, if not destroy, the jurisdictional regime and compromise carefully crafted in Kampala. No doubt, absent a Security Council referral, much of the first aggression prosecution will be consumed by litigation over this most basic of issues.
CONCLUSION

The aggression amendments are a triumph of voluntarism at
the expense of two principled alternatives that proved ultimately incompatible. One of these two alternatives is based on the discomforting and inescapable asymmetry of power in the UN system-where
sovereign equality is an abstraction rather than an empirical reality.
The other model is premised on universalism-an ideal that was un360. See Scheffer, supra note 148, at 903 (arguing that "States parties and the ICC itself
will need to come to grips with this issue long before 2017 and, ideally, resolve it to
everyone's finn assent so that the judges, when challenged by defense counsel in live cases
regarding the crime of aggression, at least can rely on a more transparent, reaffirmed and
united interpretation of the Kampala amendments among states parties and leading scholars
of the ICC.").
361. KreB & von Holtzendorff, supra note 63, at 1213 (noting that the opt out was
"born precisely in order to bridge the gap between those in favour of applying the
jurisdictional scheme under Article 12(2) . . . without modification (ABS Proposal) and
those in preference of a strictly consent-based regime (Canadian proposal).").
362. Manson, supra note 93, at 423 24 (identifying the way in which bits and pieces of
the amendments may be cobbled together to support the revisionist account); id. at 426
(noting that the Court cannot "simply ignore the plain language of [the] second sentence" of
Article 121(5), which is "baggage" that cannot be severed from the text and must instead be
applied, "whether welcome or not.").
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attainable in Rome, afortiori so in Kampala. Indeed, if universalism
could not be obtained with respect to the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, the prohibition of which indisputably constitute jus cogens, it was folly to expect it in the aggression
context. The result of this negotiating impasse is a set of amendments characterized by theoretical incoherence and profound ambiguity where a regime of state consent-in the form of a retrograde
opt out and the complete exclusion of the nationals of Non-Party
States-emerged as the only compromise possible. The final package, designed not with the best interests of the court in mind, has
merit solely as an expedient solution that enables the Assembly of
States Parties to claim completion-if not success. Aggression prosecutions will thus be left to the vagaries of States Parties' ratification
decisions rather than the vagaries of the Security Council's political
agenda. And yet, assuming States Parties even commence the ratification process at this stage given the conditional nature of the new
provisions, national legislators have no real certainty as to what exactly they are ratifying and whether their treaty partners agree with
their interpretation of the amendments, even after years of negotiations. Lost in the scramble to reach an outcome-at whatever cost to
the rule of law, standard principles of treaty interpretation, UN harmony, fairness to future defendants and the court's very legitimacywas the force of an idea: a more peaceful world.
Given that a genuine universality was never realistically possible, we are left with the question of whether the court would have
been better off with a filter system under the control of the Security
Council. Rather than attempting to circumvent power realities in international relations, such a system would have at least combined
principle with power and potentially created a more uniform and universally applicable regime. This position might have been more palatable had the Council exhibited a more consistent and robust response to threats to the peace in the past. As it stood, however, even
the most adept negotiators could not have achieved this outcome in
light of the ingrained lack of support for the P-5 position and the distrust of, and even outright hostility toward, the Council among some
vocal members of the Assembly of States Parties.
The P-5 was thus unable to convince their interlocutors to
vest the Council with exclusive authority over aggression prosecutions. As a result, they must now decide whether to attempt to influence key states (potential coalition partners, states where there are P5 boots on the ground, etc.) to either refrain from ratifying the aggression amendments or to activate the opt out in order to insulate
embattled, or potentially embattled, swaths of territory from prosecution. States that want safety from the aggression provisions must de-
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cide for themselves which of these diverging routes to take. Ultimately this choice may depend on how much confidence States Parties have in their belief that the court will adopt either the Negative or
Positive Understanding of the second sentence of Article 121(5).
Notwithstanding that the plain text of that provision will render it difficult for the court to reason otherwise, the safest course for states
wary of the new amendments might be to ratify and then opt out of
the amendments-a trickier political position for States Parties if influential elements of civil society end up rallying around full and unfettered ratification. In this regard, the coalition of states ostensibly
in favor of the crime of aggression can claim victory by garnering
greater formal acceptance of the amendments but at the expense of an
orderly ratification process free of confusion, jockeying and manipulation.
And so, we are left with a set of aggression amendments that
will spawn uncertainty and controversy given the competing interpretations of the text itself, the various opportunities to consent to or defect from the provisions and the inevitable jurisdictional patchwork
that will result. 36 3 The aggression provisions are wide open to challenge by those defendants unlucky enough to serve as guinea pigs in
this grand experiment. The inaugural aggression proceedings will no
doubt be consumed by pre-trial challenges to the very legitimacy of
the crime and its provenance. 364 Certainly the rogue regimes that will
never join the court and fall outside of the aggression amendments
are likely to view the outcome of Kampala an unmitigated success
altogether, unless the Security Council proves willing to trigger aggression prosecutions. Beyond its pre-existing Article 16 deferral
power, however, the Council was granted no additional powers to influence aggression prosecutions. So if the Council chooses to use its
referral power, it must trust the court to get it right once the Council
sets a prosecution in motion.
The ICC now faces the danger of applying an elastic and uncertain set of amendments in a fraught political context. It remains to
be seen whether pushing forward on the aggression amendments under these circumstances in their current form has planted a time bomb
in the ICC Statute that will indelibly harm the court or jeopardize its
work in responding to atrocity crimes. Most likely, the jurisdictional
regime is so cumbersome and pocked with loopholes that aggression
363. Scheffer, supra note 148, at 904 (anticipating the "patchy" jurisdiction of the court
will undennine the principle of sovereign equality).
364. Id. at 903 (arguing that defense counsel will inevitably challenge the way in which
the amendment provisions have been applied to the crime of aggression).
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